Meaning and the Situated Mind: How Context Guides Mental Representations Formed from Language by Hauser, David
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meaning and the Situated Mind: How Context Guides Mental Representations Formed 
from Language 
 
by 
 
David James Hauser 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Psychology) 
in the University of Michigan 
2017 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
 
 Professor Phoebe Ellsworth, Chair 
 Associate Professor Sonya Dal Cin 
 Professor Nick Ellis 
 Professor Norbert Schwarz, University of Southern California  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David J. Hauser 
 
djhauser@umich.edu 
 
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-5480-5213 
 
 
 
© David J. Hauser 
 
 
  
ii 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 For Li; my present, past, and future. 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This is probably the more difficult section of the dissertation to write because I owe a 
great deal of thanks to a great deal of people. I probably should have kept a running google doc 
of this from day one, but free recall will have to do. In no particular order, thank you: 
All of the Michigan Social Psychology faculty, especially – Norbert, for everything but 
especially for helping me hone my research identity. Phoebe, for advice and encouragement I 
sorely needed. Ali & Sonya, for running labs with lively social cognition talk. Nick, for quickly 
filling in my missing knowledge on language and meaning. 
Li, of course, for being my constant source of encouragement and happiness. 
All of my friends who kept me going – Josh, Diana, Mike, for all of the great (and 
helpful!) conversations in 3233 through the years. Orphan Lab – Josh, Steve, Joe, for all the 
“productive” lab meetings in Ashleys through the years. Ed, Spike, Jesse, Bremner, Steph, Linda, 
Neil, Dave Lee, Pat, Stephen, Hakeem, Izzy, for being there. 
All of my Research Assistants – Aashna Sunderrajan, Madhuri Natarajan, Samantha 
Levine, Marina Antonucci, Melissa Bennett, Gabby Trupp, Rod Satterwhite, Vivian Jiang, Jackie 
Wold, Ellie Rosen, Megan MacDonald, Sean Kua, Meghan Brown, Anni Subar, Nicole 
Tannenbaum, Kaushal Kulkarni, Isabel Savile, & Jenna Manske, for getting your hands dirty and 
doing the grunt work with me. And all my 14,000+ participants through the years (MTurk 
studies have large Ns), for your thoughts.  
iv 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DEDICATION ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii 
LIST OF FIGURES vii 
LIST OF TABLES viii 
ABSTRACT ix 
CHAPTER I: Interpreting meaning 1 
Interpreting meaning with and without the mental lexicon 1 
Situated social cognition 5 
Connecting literatures on the context-sensitivity of meaning 6 
CHAPTER II: Metaphoric framing affects inferences about cancer 10 
Metaphors shape thought 12 
Present research 14 
Study 1 17 
Study 2 20 
Study 3 26 
General discussion 34 
CHAPTER III: Incidental states with metaphoric relevance guide meaning inferences 38 
Weight and importance 39 
v 
 
The role of elaborative thought 41 
The present research 44 
Method 45 
Results 46 
Discussion 48 
CHAPTER IV: Semantic prosody guides inferences about meaning 52 
Semantic prosody 54 
Semantic prosody and valenced meaning 56 
The present research 57 
Pilot studies: synonymy and valence of semantically prosodic terms and control 
terms 
 
59 
Causing bad outcomes and producing good ones: Studies 1a and 1b 66 
Another look at whether ambiguity moderates semantic prosody effects: Study 2 69 
From evaluations of the outcome to predictions about the actor: Study 3 79 
A generalized effect of semantic prosody: Study 4 81 
Summary of effects across studies 87 
General discussion 88 
CHAPTER V: A model of inferring meaning 92 
A catalogue of factors that affect meaning 93 
Word-level factors 94 
Sentence-level factors 98 
Text-level factors 103 
Reader-level factors 106 
vi 
 
Implications of the model 113 
Conclusion 118 
APPENDIX 119 
REFERENCES 124 
 
 
 
  
vii 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Message metaphor by behavior type on the mean number of behaviors listed 19 
Figure 2. Message metaphor by behavior frame on self-limiting intention 33 
Figure 3. Mean outcome valence by word and prosody valence 84 
 
 
 
 
 
  
viii 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. How common cancer prevention recommendations fit with engagement and 
limitation 
 
16 
Table 2. Message metaphor by intention index on mean (SD) behavioral intention 24 
Table 3. Projected mean importance by book weight, presence of substantive information, 
and NFC 
 
47 
Table 4. Word statistics for stimuli in studies 1 through 3 60 
Table 5. Valence and synonymy ratings for semantically prosodic words and non-prosodic 
synonyms 
 
63 
Table 6. Actor valence for sentence fragments used in study 2 72 
Table 7. Mean (standard deviation) valence rating by subject valence and verb 75 
Table 8. Mean (standard deviation) intentionality rating by subject valence and verb 79 
Table 9. Summary of effect sizes in ambiguous contexts across studies 87 
Table 10. Word-level factors on meaning interpretation 94 
Table 11. Sentence-level factors on meaning interpretation 98 
Table 12. Text-level factors on meaning interpretation 103 
Table 13. Reader-level factors on meaning interpretation 105 
Table A1. Word statistics for semantically prosodic words in Chapter IV. 119 
  
ix 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
How do humans understand the meaning of words? Generative views of language 
presume that word meanings are stored in a mental lexicon and retrieved when a word is 
encountered. On the other hand, new research on language suggests that word meanings are 
heavily derived from and dependent upon situational context. Furthermore, new research on 
situated social cognition emphasizes the situated nature of human reasoning, showing how stable 
thought processes are actually highly sensitive to context and situations. 
In this dissertation, I argue that humans construct mental representations of word 
meaning by drawing upon contextual and situational information, in line with both new research 
on language and views of situated social cognition. I present three papers that support this 
hypothesis. In chapter two, I demonstrate how people draw upon surface metaphors relating 
cancer to an enemy to understand cancer and how to prevent it. In chapter three, I show that 
people draw upon incidental sensory states of heaviness to infer whether a book’s synopsis relays 
its importance. And in chapter four, I establish that the generalized affect of a word’s 
collocational profile (i.e., its semantic prosody) guides meaning inferences.  
The final (fifth) chapter summarizes factors that guide what meaning is interpreted from 
words and statements. These factors are organized at different levels of analysis (word-, 
sentence-, text-, and reader-level), and come from a variety of disciplines. The model ultimately 
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demonstrates that inferences of meaning are highly sensitive to context, and implications for 
social psychology are discussed.  
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CHAPTER I 
Interpreting meaning 
 When humans are exposed to words and statements, they usually derive some sort of 
meaning from them, which guides their judgments and behaviors. Students attempt to understand 
the material covered in a textbook; travelers try to decipher airport displays to reach their gate; 
readers parse through novels to understand what happens to their beloved characters in a fictional 
universe. Finding meaning in the communications of others is a critical element to human 
functioning. 
Interpreting meaning with and without the mental lexicon 
 But how do humans interpret the meaning of words and statements? Many hold the 
conventional idea that interpreting the meaning of text is a matter of connecting words to stored 
meanings in a mental lexicon. The idea is an intuitively appealing one, suggesting that humans 
have a mental dictionary that stores the meanings of words. When a word is encountered, the 
corresponding meaning from the dictionary is retrieved from long-term memory and brought into 
short-term memory; thus, a mental representation is brought up, and meaning is interpreted (Katz 
& Fodor, 1963; Fodor, 1975; Jackendoff, 2002; Aitchison, 2012). Early theories from semiotics 
posit similar relations. Signs such as words correspond with underlying meaning. Issues of 
interpretation arise because sign -meaning relationships are arbitrary and not shared across 
languages and cultures, but most of the time, meaning is shared and all members of a culture 
agree to the same meaning of a given word (Chandler, 2007). 
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 The theory of the mental lexicon is embedded within much of psychology. It draws upon 
familiar processes from the cognitive revolution such a memory stores and memory retrieval, and 
it utilizes a familiar conceptual metaphor of the MIND is a DICTIONARY (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). It underscores the familiar dichotomy between denotative meaning, what a concept 
actually means, and connotative meaning, the associative properties of a concept (Lyons, 1977), 
and this dichotomy factors into some psychological research (Wimmer, Gruber, & Perner, 1985; 
Brownell, Potter, Michelow, & Gardner, 1984). Research has also attempted to measure the 
stable evaluative dimensions of words within the mental lexicon (Osgood, 1952; Osgood, May, 
& Miron, 1975), and some have developed dictionaries that contain normed ratings of different 
dimensions (affect, concreteness, dominance, etc) for large lists of words (Bradley & Lang, 
1999; Stone, Dunphy, & Smith, 1966; Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013; Pennebaker, 
Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015). These efforts assume that words connect to stable meanings 
contained within the mental lexicon. 
 The mental lexicon is also a major part of social psychology, including the subfield of 
social cognition. Much of social cognition borrows from the processes of the cognitive 
revolution (Zajonc, 1980), examining aspects of perception of the outside world (Griffin & Ross, 
1991; Sherif, 1936), schemas and stereotypes (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), person 
perception (Asch, 1946), etc. While social psychology often focuses upon how the situation 
matters (Sommers, 2011), many phenomena are interpreted in a cognitive light with an implicit 
assumption of a mental lexical store for words. For instance, conceptual accessibility research 
discusses how exposure to words activates associated mental representations (Srull & Wyer, 
1979; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977), and person perception research shows how trait 
descriptor words change impressions of others (Asch, 1946). Indeed, much of social psychology 
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assumes the existence of relatively stable, context-independent cognitive processes, such as a 
mental lexicon (Zajonc, 1980). 
 However, many other approaches to the study of language acquisition and comprehension 
point to the crucial role of context in word meaning. First, many theories emphasize that context 
helps language-users determine what a target word means in any given instance. For instance, 
constraint-based approaches to language learning show how linguistic and non-linguistic context 
provides constraints on the possible meaning of a word within an utterance or statement – 
comprehending each word of a statement involves accounting for the constraints imposed by 
nearby words (for reviews, see Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999; MacDonald & Seidenberg, 
2006). Usage-based approaches to language learning posit similar relations, focusing upon how 
language is learned through interacting with other people, observing what words and 
grammatical constructions are used to describe things and phenomena, and abstracting meaning 
from these observations (for reviews, see Ellis, O’Donnell, & Romer, 2015; Beckner et al, 2009). 
Connectionist models of language (such as the Simple Recurrent Network) attempts to model 
language comprehension by describing how words activate mental representations in a recursive 
loop. Words prompt activations of mental states which are moderated by prior activations (via 
exposure to prior words and context) and which moderates the action that future words have 
upon mental states (for reviews, see Elman, 2004; 2011). In essence, the context surrounding a 
word is nearly as informative about the meaning of a word as the word itself. Thus, to say that 
word meanings are retrieved from stable representations in a mental lexicon ignores the large 
impact that situational context has in inferring meaning 
Second, the context that a word appears in contributes to and iteratively updates a 
language-user’s understanding of the range of meaning that any given word has. Constraint-
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based approaches emphasize that people not only learn what a word “means” but they also they 
learn the entire range of possibilities of what a word could mean given the constraints of 
linguistic and non-linguistic context (Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999; MacDonald & 
Seidenberg, 2006).  Corpus and computational linguistics regularly demonstrate how words tend 
to co-occur (i.e., collocate) with other specific words and contexts (Hoey, 2005), and these 
collocational profiles are fundamental elements of the semantic space that a word occupies 
(Landuaer & Dumais, 1997). Further, many lexicographers acknowledge the importance of an 
individual’s experience with a word and how it is used as a crucial determinant of the range of 
meanings of that word, so much so that different audiences would require different dictionaries 
in order to accurately represent how experience can imbue words with different meanings 
(Kilgarriff, 1997). In essence, a language-user’s history of experiences with a word, including 
the context in which a word was used, feeds into his/her understanding and expectations of the 
word. Thus, to say that a words link to stable stored meanings in a mental lexicon which all users 
of a language share ignores the ample amount of learned contextual information that comprises 
an individual’s understanding of the “meaning” of a word.  
These considerations imply either that the lexicon is infeasibly large in order to contain 
all of these disparate meanings and moderators of meaning or that there may be no mental 
lexicon at all. Context has a larger role to play in meaning interpretation than is traditionally 
assumed, and there are many more processes beyond the simple “retrieving meanings of words” 
in interpreting the meaning of a sentence. Instead, words may serve as cues to meaning, 
activating associations that are informed by prior context and that inform the upcoming 
associations. Meaning may be constructed by contextual cues which include words but also 
grammatical constructions, phonological patterns, and other contextual factors (MacDonald & 
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Seidenberg, 2006; Beckner et al., 2009; Hoey, 2005; Elman, 2011; Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015; 
Swales, 1990). 
Situated social cognition 
 These ideas that meaning depends upon context share much with theories of situated 
cognition. Classic views of cognition posit automatic, context-independent processes like 
memory storage, memory retrieval, and conceptual schemas (Bartlett, 1932; Devine, Hamilton, 
& Ostrom, 1994; Jones, 1985). However, the idea behind situated cognition is that thinking is 
more tied to its situations and contexts than previously thought (Smith & Semin, 2004; Smith & 
Semin, 2007; Schwarz, 1994). In line with William James’ remarks, “My thinking is first and 
last and always for the sake of my doing” (James, 1890), cognition and reasoning are adapted 
from helping humans interact with and make sense out of their environments and situations. 
Rather than seeing cognition as an abstract process that is detached from physical reality and 
environments, situation cognition posits that cognition should be intricately attuned to 
environments and contexts. This is because it is adapted from and adapted to dealing with the 
demands and affordances of physical environments and situations. 
Recent research has supported the context-sensitivity of social cognitive processes that 
were classically presumed to be context-free. Context affects categorizing (Yeh & Barsalou, 
2006); motivation affects the use of stereotypes (Sinclair & Kunda, 1999); accessibility affects 
the use of stereotypes (Bodenhausen et al, 1995); communicative context affects attribution 
(Norenzayan & Schwarz, 1999). Just as inferring the meaning of words is dependent upon 
context, so too are cognitive processes in general. 
 Understanding how humans interpret meaning has mostly been studied in the domain of 
language learning, usage, and comprehension, focusing upon how shared language users learn 
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and understand a language. This literature often discusses models that are demonstrated by 
investigating how readers and listeners resolve ambiguity in texts (Zwaan & Radavansky, 1998; 
Elman, 2011; MacDonald & Seidenberg, 2006; Beckner et al., 2009). As language is the variable 
of interest, manipulations are typically text-based; investigators uncover how words and 
grammar affect the meaning of target words. However, mental representations that are derived 
from texts are also studied in social cognition research. Many of these studies demonstrate how 
mental representations are affected by contextual, situational processes. As this field is interested 
in the role of context in general, studies examine simple text-based manipulations and complex 
situational manipulations on judgments. While these judgments take many forms (e.g., 
judgments about people, objects, situations, etc), they can still be conceptualized as exacting 
effects upon mental representations that are derived from text. In responding to a question, one 
must first comprehend it and construct a mental representation that adequately models it 
(Cannell, Miller, & Oksenberg, 1981; Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000). It is at this stage 
when contextual processes may contribute information or modify existing information that 
formulates the mental representation, which then affects reasoning and judgments. 
Connecting literatures on the context-sensitivity of meaning 
I argue that these two disparate literatures deserve to be connected as they both illustrate 
critical aspects of how humans interpret the meaning of statements. While research on language 
comprehension has focused on how words and linguistic context affects meaning, research on 
situated social cognition has expanded the scope to also investigate how other non-text based 
factors affect the meaning derived from texts. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how contextual features of the situation can 
affect the mental representations derived from texts. While many classic phenomena in social 
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cognition are couched in cognitive theories, many of them actually demonstrate contextual 
processes that affect meaning interpretation. As such, they can be reinterpreted as evidence in 
support of the context-sensitivity of meaning. For instance, research on category accessibility 
demonstrates how activating categories affects judgments due to cognitive processes such as 
semantic networks and spreading activation (Srull & Wyer, 1979; Higgins et al., 1977) However, 
“primed” judgments often concern assessments of the traits of another person based on a 
character vignette, and the “primed” category acts as a contextual factor that affects the 
assessment of such text vignettes. Thus, these studies demonstrate how context (i.e., incidentally 
activated concepts) affects the conclusions that people draw about another person from reading 
statements about them; context affects inferred meaning. A similar lens can (and will) be applied 
to many findings in the social cognition literature. 
This dissertation presents research from three projects that all show how contextual 
factors affect the meaning that people interpret from statements. In the second chapter, I examine 
how popular metaphors that relate cancer to a hostile enemy affect thinking about cancer. While 
these metaphors are commonplace in modern discourse, three studies demonstrate that surface 
metaphoric language relating cancer to an enemy (vs more neutral language) affect the mental 
representations that people hold about cancer. Because limiting is less associated with fighting 
enemies, these metaphors make limiting cancer risk-increasing behaviors (such as eating red 
meats) seem less effective for preventing cancer and lessen people’s intentions for them (vs 
when no conceptual metaphors are activated). As such, contextual metaphors surrounding words 
can affect people’s understanding of such words. 
 In the third chapter, I demonstrate how sensory states with metaphoric relevance affect 
the mental representations that people form from a book synopsis. Just like metaphorical 
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statements imply that heavy objects are important, the incidental heaviness of an object often 
affects impressions of its importance (Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009; Ackerman, Nocera, 
& Bargh, 2010). In this study, I demonstrate boundary conditions for this effect that suggest it 
occurs because of confirmatory reasoning processes. Only participants who were thinking 
elaboratively and viewing substantive information about a book (in the form of a book synopsis) 
judged heavier books to be more important than light books. However, the study demonstrates 
that incidental sensory states with metaphoric relevance can affect the meaning that participants 
draw from reading a book synopsis. 
 In the fourth chapter, I describe how a word’s collocational profile affects inferences of 
meaning. Words that have negative semantic prosody are said to typically collocate (i.e., co-
occur) with words of negative valence, and vice versa for words with positive semantic prosody. 
In this chapter, I describe how even though readers may not be fully aware of the semantic 
prosody of words, they nonetheless react to them when forming judgments about ambiguous 
concepts. For example, even though most people see the word “cause” as having no affect, the 
word has negative semantic prosody because most of the things that are “caused” are strongly 
negative in affect (“death,” “disease,” “problems,” etc; Stubbs, 1995). Accordingly, several 
studies show that participants infer “caused” outcomes as being more negative than “produced” 
outcomes (even though they see “cause” and “produce,” a word with no semantic prosody, as 
being synonymous). Overall, we find that semantic prosody guides people’s inferences 
concerning meaning. 
The final (fifth) chapter provides a model of inferring meaning that summarizes the 
variety of factors that guide what meaning is interpreted from words and statements. Some 
factors are language-focused fields (e.g., cognitive linguistics, psycholinguistics, corpus 
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linguistics, lexicography, etc) while others are from situated social cognition. Finally, 
implications of this model for social psychology are discussed.  
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CHAPTER II 
Metaphoric framing affect inferences about cancer 
 
 Note. This work was published in Hauser, D. J. & Schwarz, N. (2015). The war on 
prevention: Bellicose cancer metaphors hurt (some) prevention intentions. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 41, 66-77. 
 Abstract. Cancer health information is dominated by enemy and war metaphors intended 
to motivate the public to “fight” cancer. However, enemy metaphoric framing may influence 
understanding of, and responses to, cancer. Cancer prevention benefits from avoiding risk 
increasing behaviors, yet self-limitation is not closely associated with fighting enemies. If so, the 
metaphor may hurt prevention intentions involving self-limitation. Participants read messages 
with minute wording variations that established different metaphoric frames. Results show that 
metaphorically framing cancer as an enemy lessens the conceptual accessibility of (Study 1) and 
intention for self-limiting prevention behaviors while not increasing intention for monitoring and 
treatment behaviors (Studies 2 and 3). Framing self-limiting prevention behaviors in terms of 
fighting an enemy increases their appeal, illustrating the benefits of metaphor matching (Study 
3). Overall, these results suggest that enemy metaphors in cancer information reduce some 
prevention intentions without increasing others, making their use potentially harmful for public 
health. 
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“Now is the time to commit ourselves to waging a war against cancer as 
aggressive as the war cancer wages against us.” –Barack Obama (Lennon, 2009) 
 
Public discourse about cancer is dominated by enemy metaphors, from society’s “war on cancer” 
to an individual’s “heroic battles” with a “harsh enemy” (Gibbs & Franks, 2002; Bowker, 1996; 
Sontag, 1978). Although discussion of cancer has included this bellicose discourse for some 
time, it was elevated when the War on Cancer was popularized by fear-appeal based 
advertisement campaigns in the 1970s as a way to drum up funding for cancer research. The 
Cold War was a salient fear at the time, and advertisements simply asked for governmental 
funding to deal with the cancer “threat” (Mukherjee, 2010). Framing cancer as an enemy served 
as an effective fear appeal because it met the necessary conditions for effective fear appeals (for 
reviews, see McGuire, 1972; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953):  it evoked fear by riding the 
coattails of a salient theme (war with enemies), and it made a clear recommendation that was 
easy for the public and government to implement (support cancer research). However, while 
times have changed, this portrayal of cancer as an enemy has persisted. It pervades public 
discourse, figures prominently in slogans of cancer research organizations (e.g., “Celebrate. 
Remember. Fight back.” – American Cancer Society’s Relay for Life; “Love life. Fight cancer.” 
– Dutch Cancer Society), and even enters into discussion of preventative behaviors (Foods that 
Fight Cancer: Preventing Cancer through Diet, Beliveau & Gingras, 2006). It is also the most 
common conceptual metaphor employed in science journalism about cancer (Camus, 2009). 
Some fear appeals have proven effective in cancer prevention (Stephenson & Witte, 1998), and 
video game interventions where players virtually battle and destroy enemy cancer cells can 
increase treatment adherence in young cancer patients (Kato, Cole, Bradlyn, & Pollock, 2008) as 
well as  perceptions of cancer risk in young non-patient populations (Khalil, 2012). Indeed, the 
prevailing wisdom suggests that fear evoked by portraying cancer as an enemy would encourage 
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people to “fight” cancer in their own personal lives and promote beneficial behavioral change. 
 Because metaphors shape and structure thought (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), however, it is 
possible that metaphorically framing cancer as an enemy affects people’s understanding of the 
disease in unintended ways. For instance, thinking of cancer as an enemy may give patients a 
preference for overly aggressive treatment options (because one acts aggressively toward 
enemies; Aktipis, Maley, & Neuberg, 2010) and may hurt the intention to engage in preventive 
behaviors that are less associated with fighting enemies. While such conjectures are compatible 
with conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), they go against the prevailing 
wisdom that emphasizes the potential of the enemy metaphor to motivate beneficial behaviors 
(Mukherjee, 2010; Stephenson & Witte, 1998; Kato et al., 2008; Khalil, 2012). The current 
research investigates the potential effects of bellicose conceptual metaphors on people’s 
understanding of cancer and intention to engage in a range of prevention behaviors.  
Metaphors shape thought 
Conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) posits that metaphors structure 
thinking by providing conceptual mappings between concrete and abstract concepts. Concrete 
concepts highlight relevant aspects of metaphorically related abstract concepts, deemphasize 
irrelevant aspects, and ultimately guide knowledge of and reasoning about the abstract concept. 
Since the initial work in cognitive linguistics, extensive experimental research has illuminated 
how abstract concepts are understood in terms of metaphorically related concrete domains (for a 
review, see Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010). For instance, interpersonal warmth is often 
understood in terms of physical warmth (Williams & Bargh, 2008); importance is understood in 
terms of physical weight (Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2010; Chandler, Reinhard, & Schwarz, 
2012; Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009); valence and power are related to verticality (Meier 
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& Robinson, 2004; Schubert, 2005), and so are God and Devil related concepts (Meier, Hauser, 
Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007). As many conceptual metaphors are learned via 
linguistic experience, linguistic framing of an abstract concept via the use of metaphoric 
expressions can also activate a metaphoric representation of the abstract concept and influence 
reasoning (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Landau, Sullivan, & Greenberg, 2009; for reviews, see 
Gibbs, 2014; Ottati, Renstrom, & Price, 2014). For instance, metaphorically framing crime as 
either a virus plaguing a city or as a beast ravaging a city causes people to propose different 
solutions to a hypothetical crime wave (Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). Similarly, metaphoric 
framing of America as a body harshens Americans’ attitudes toward immigration when they are 
threatened by physical contamination (Landau, Sullivan, & Greenberg, 2009). In short, varying 
the accessibility of concrete metaphors for abstract concepts via metaphoric framing can guide 
reasoning in the abstract domain in metaphor-consistent ways. 
 Further illustrating the power of metaphors, a meta-analysis of persuasive messages 
found that the use of metaphors reliably increases persuasion when they metaphorically frame a 
familiar target early in the message in terms of a single novel source domain (Sopory & Dillard, 
2002). The persuasive influence of metaphors can unfold through multiple pathways (for 
reviews, see Ottati & Renstrom, 2010; Ottati, Renstrom, & Price, 2014). For instance, 
metaphoric conceptualizations of abstract concepts can be activated in multiple ways (Ottati, 
Renstrom, & Price, 2014), such as by directly stating the root metaphor (“Cancer is an enemy”), 
or through more subtle means like evoking the root metaphor through surface metaphoric 
utterances (“We must win the war on cancer” ). Additionally, once a root metaphor is activated, 
metaphors can affect judgments through multiple processes. Metaphors can affect the amount of 
message elaboration when they link the target to a domain that is of interest to the recipient; for 
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example, sports metaphors increase elaboration of persuasive messages for sports fans and 
decrease elaboration for non-sports fans (Ottati, Rhoads, & Graesser, 1999). Metaphors also 
increase persuasion when they match the recipient’s lay metaphoric representation of the topic 
(Sopory, 2005) and hence increase fluent access to related knowledge. Metaphors can also 
contribute to attitude change by directly mapping attributes from the source to the target domain, 
as is the case for the NATION IS A BODY metaphor, which maps attributes of physical 
contamination onto the abstract concept of national immigration policy (Landau et al., 2009).  
Present research 
 Drawing on these insights from metaphoric framing research, the present studies 
investigate whether conceptual metaphors that relate cancer to an enemy influence people’s 
reasoning about cancer and their willingness to engage in a variety of preventive behaviors. The 
studies also bear on whether key theoretical findings of metaphoric framing research extend 
across different manipulations and into socially-relevant content domains. As noted in recent 
discussions (Stroebe & Strack, 2014), consistent effects of multiple operationalizations of a 
conceptual variable across diverse content domains are a crucial criterion for the robustness of a 
theoretical approach.  
The prevailing wisdom in health communication is that fear raised by enemy framing will 
motivate people to engage in beneficial preventive behaviors (Mukherjee, 2010; Stephenson & 
Witte, 1998; Kato et al., 2008; Khalil, 2012). However, we hypothesized that, in line with the 
theory of metaphoric framing (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), framing cancer as an enemy should 
cause people to bring attributes of enemies to bear on their representation of cancer. While this 
may enhance motivation to engage in prevention behaviors related to an enemy metaphor, it may 
hurt the motivation to engage in prevention behaviors that are difficult to reconcile with this 
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metaphor. Unfortunately, the latter applies to the bulk of behaviors that support cancer 
prevention.  
 The enemy metaphor emphasizes power, strength, masculinity, and taking aggressive 
actions toward an enemy (Reisfield & Wilson, 2004; Harrington, 2012). As such, behaviors 
which entail active engagement are particularly suited to the enemy metaphor because they help 
bolster these attributes and promote attacking an enemy. However, behaviors which entail 
limitation and restraint are less applicable to the enemy metaphor because they often undermine 
attributes of power, strength, and masculinity, and they don’t promote attacking an enemy. 
Cancer prevention recommendations promote either engagement or limitation and, accordingly, 
differ in their applicability to fighting enemies. Table 1 displays the eleven cancer prevention 
recommendations that an expert review identified as efficient in reducing the risk of developing 
cancer (World Cancer Research Fund & the American Institute for Cancer Research, 2007); the 
table also notes whether the recommendation promotes engagement or limitation.  Other 
organizations have arrived at similar prevention recommendations (see Kushi et al., 2012). 
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Table 1. How common cancer prevention recommendations fit with engagement and limitation 
Prevention recommendation (American Institute for Cancer Research, 2012) 
Engagement or 
limitation? 
Be as lean as possible without becoming underweight. engage 
Be physically active for at least 30 minutes every day. engage 
Avoid sugary drinks. Limit consumption of energy-dense foods. limit 
Eat more of a variety of vegetables, fruits, whole grains and legumes such as 
beans. 
engage 
Limit consumption of red meats (such as beef, pork and lamb) and avoid 
processed meats. 
limit 
If consumed at all, limit alcoholic drinks to 2 for men and 1 for women a 
day. 
limit 
Limit consumption of salty foods and foods processed with salt (sodium). limit 
Don't use supplements to protect against cancer. limit 
It is best for mothers to breastfeed exclusively for up to 6 months and then 
add other liquids and foods. 
--- 
After treatment, cancer survivors should follow the recommendations for 
cancer prevention. 
--- 
And always remember – do not smoke or chew tobacco. limit 
 
As the prevention recommendations in Table 1 illustrate, cancer prevention is only 
occasionally characterized by active engagement in behaviors that also come to mind while 
thinking of fighting a battle against an aggressor. Instead, many of the more efficient prevention 
behaviors amount to self-limitation (avoid smoking; avoid alcohol; avoid fatty foods; avoid red 
meats; etc). Unfortunately, self-limitation is a class of behaviors that is unlikely to figure 
prominently in people’s associations with fighting enemies.  
 A pilot study using the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies, 2008) 
confirmed this intuition. Linguistically, limitation is less associated with attacking than it is with 
prevention. In natural language, there is less co-occurrence of limitation related words with the 
word ATTACK than with the word PREVENT; for instance, the odds of seeing the word 
INHIBIT within nine words before or after the target word ATTACK in natural language are 
one-twentieth that of seeing it within nine words before or after the target word PREVENT. 
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Given that word co-occurrence corresponds with semantic association (Landauer & Dumais, 
1997), this data highlight that limitation is less associated with an enemy concept than with a 
prevention concept. This suggests that people don’t think of limiting the self when they think of 
fighting enemies. If so, framing cancer in terms of an enemy metaphor may lessen people’s 
intention to engage in some of the more effective prevention behaviors available to them. 
In the following series of studies, we test this possibility. In study 1, we examine if the 
enemy representation affects the accessibility of limitation-related prevention behaviors. In 
studies 2 and 3, we explore if the enemy representation affects intention for various prevention, 
monitoring, and treatment behaviors. In addition, study 3 explores whether the predicted adverse 
effects of enemy framing are attenuated when prevention behaviors are presented in a 
metaphorical language that matches the metaphor used in the message.  
Study 1 
 Assuming that limiting the self is not closely associated with the concept of fighting an 
enemy, framing cancer as an enemy should impair the accessibility of prevention behaviors that 
involve self-limitation. Study 1 tests this hypothesis. 
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty-four American participants (22 female) from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed 
the task in exchange for 30 cents. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants first read background information on cancer. The information concerned the 
development of cancer, who was at risk of developing cancer, the percentage of people who 
survive cancer diagnoses (adapted from Cancer Facts & Figures, American Cancer Society, 
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2012), and how eating habits relate to cancer. Participants were then asked to list what they 
would do to lessen their chances of developing cancer in their lifetime; they were provided nine 
open-ended text boxes to type in their responses. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to either an enemy metaphoric frame or a neutral 
frame. In the enemy frame condition, the background information included two additional words 
in the first sentence of the passage (shown here in italics): “Cancer is a broad group of diseases 
characterized by the hostile growth and invasive spread of abnormal cells.” The two italicized 
words were missing in the neutral frame condition. Additionally, the listing task prompt read 
“what things would you do to fight against developing cancer” in the enemy frame condition, but 
“what things would you do to reduce your risk of developing cancer” in the neutral frame 
condition. Our method of framing falls in line with the “surface metaphoric utterances” method 
of subtly activating a root metaphor as discussed in Ottati, Renstrom, & Price (2014). 
 Two coders, blind to hypotheses and participant condition, rated whether each behavior 
listed by the participants was a self-limiting behavior or a self-bolstering behavior. Rating 
instructions said a self-bolstering behavior was “one that people engage in in order to lower their 
risk of cancer,” while a self-limiting behavior was “one where people limit or avoid a behavior 
which is associated with increasing one’s risk of cancer.” Coders classified the behaviors as self-
bolstering, self-limiting or neither by rating them along a 1 (clearly self-bolstering) to 5 (clearly 
self-limiting) scale. The two coders’ ratings were highly consistent, r(330) = .94; coders 
disagreed on 37 items (11.2% of items), which were resolved through discussion. Our analysis 
draws on the number of reported self-bolstering vs. self-limiting behaviors; analyses based on the 
raw rating scores lead to the same conclusions. 
Results and Discussion 
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 We counted the number of self-bolstering and self-limiting behaviors listed and 
conducted a 2 (metaphor: enemy, neutral) x 2 (behavior type: self-bolstering, self-limiting) 
mixed analysis of variance. Overall, participants listed more self-bolstering than self-limiting 
behaviors, F(1, 62) = 12.18, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .164, for the main effect of behavior type. More 
important, this observation was qualified by the predicted interaction of behavior type and 
metaphor, F(1, 62) = 5.68, p = .020, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .084. As shown in Figure 1, exposure to the enemy 
metaphor reduced the listing of self-limiting behaviors relative to the neutral frame condition 
{F(1, 62) = 6.96, p = .011, d = .66, 95% CI [0.17, 1.29], for the simple effect} without increasing 
the listing of self-bolstering prevention behaviors {F(1, 62) = 1.30, p = .26, for the simple 
effect}. This indicates that an enemy metaphor reduces the accessibility of self-limiting 
prevention behaviors without increasing the accessibility of self-bolstering ones. Finally, the 
main effect of metaphor was not significant, F < 1, suggesting that, counter to the prevailing 
wisdom, enemy framing does not simply increase thoughts of beneficial behaviors. 
Figure 1. Message metaphor by behavior type on the mean number of behaviors listed 
 
Note. Bars denote -/+ 1 SE of the mean. 
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beneficial effect of enemy-framing on self-bolstering behavior accessibility as one would 
intuitively expect. One reason for this may be differences in chronic accessibility of the behavior 
types; participants listed more self-bolstering than self-limiting behaviors, suggesting that self-
bolstering behaviors may be more chronically-accessible than self-limiting ones. We explore 
these differences in chronic accessibility and ambiguity in the next study. 
 While these effects on accessibility provide preliminary support for our hypotheses, 
additional framing manipulations are necessary to rule out alternate explanations stemming from 
the use of one specific method of framing. Therefore, Study 2 employs a different framing 
manipulation in a conceptual replication and extension of study 1. 
Study 2 
 Building on the observation that metaphorical framing influences what comes to mind 
when people are asked to list potential prevention measures (study 1), study 2 tests whether the 
observed effects extend to behavioral intentions. The prevailing wisdom would suggest that 
enemy framing would increase intentions for all behaviors that would help someone “fight” 
cancer (i.e., prevention, monitoring, and treatment). However, in line with conceptual metaphor 
theory, we hypothesized that metaphorically framing cancer as an enemy in a message would 
lessen intention for self-limiting prevention behaviors. 
Furthermore, many have offered the conjecture that an enemy representation might boost 
motivation for active, agentic behaviors against cancer. For instance, because one must be active 
to fight enemies, one must also take active steps to fight cancer (Reisfield & Wilson, 2004; 
Harrington, 2012). Additionally, because one fights enemies aggressively, one must also fight 
cancer by opting for aggressive treatments (Aktipis et al., 2010). To our knowledge, study 2 
provides the first experimental test of these conjectures by examining the effect of enemy cancer 
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framing on a range of preventive intentions (i.e., self-limiting and self-bolstering prevention, 
monitoring, and treatment). If the enemy representation boosts motivation for active agentic 
behaviors, enemy framing should boost intention for self-bolstering, monitoring, and treatment 
behaviors, while undermining intentions to engage in self-limiting behaviors. 
Finally, study 2 added another metaphoric framing condition to the design – that of 
cancer as imbalance. Recent research has shown that the use of any applicable metaphor in 
health information about vaccination can increase a reader’s intention to get vaccinated (Scherer, 
Scherer, & Fagerlin, in press). Therefore, the imbalance metaphor condition serves as a control 
that tests whether  the predicted effect of enemy framing is unique to this metaphor (as we 
expect) or also observed for other metaphors that have different substantive implications. 
Furthermore, the imbalance conceptualization was once the dominant conceptual metaphor for 
disease (Goatly, 2007; Mukherjee, 2010) and is still the dominant conceptual metaphor for most 
diseases in Chinese cultures (Stibbe, 1996). In fact, some medical scholars suggest that illness 
and treatment may better fit an imbalance metaphor than an enemy metaphor. For example, 
ecological balance metaphors emphasize population-level prevention and sustainable treatment 
practices (Annas, 1995; Nesse & Williams, 1996), unlike bellicose metaphors which emphasize 
defeating diseases at all costs. . For these reasons, the remaining studies include an imbalance 
metaphor framing group for comparison purposes. 
Method 
Participants 
 Three hundred and thirteen American participants (113 female; age range 18 to 67) 
completed the survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for 25 cents each. 
Materials and Procedure 
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 In an ostensible pre-test of health information messages, participants were randomly 
assigned to read one of three messages that framed cancer either in neutral terms or in terms of 
an enemy or imbalance metaphor. The message is presented below, with the words unique to the 
enemy message in brackets and words unique to the imbalance message in parentheses. The 
neutral message consisted of all words outside of parentheses and brackets: 
Colorectal cancer is cancer of the colon. This disease involves (an imbalance of) 
[an enemy uprising of] abnormal cellular growth in the large intestine. At any 
given point in time, a healthy person has small amounts of cancerous cells which 
his/her body deals with. However, (an unbalanced) [a hostile] growth of 
cancerous cells in the large intestine can form a tumor, which can metastasize in 
nearby or distant parts of the body. The average American faces a 5% lifetime 
risk of developing colorectal cancer as a result of (unbalanced) [hostile] abnormal 
cellular growth. In 2008, 608,000 deaths worldwide were due to colorectal cancer. 
 
 Following filler questions about the message, participants reported their intention to 
engage in various health behaviors related to cancer (1 = do not intend; 7 = strongly intend). 
Self-limiting prevention questions asked “how much do you intend to limit” behaviors associated 
with a high risk of cancer (drinking alcohol excessively; eating red meats more than once per 
day; eating high fat, high calorie foods). Self-bolstering prevention questions asked “how much 
do you intend to engage in” behaviors that are associated with a low risk of cancer (eating fruits 
and vegetables, eating foods high in fiber, eating foods made of whole grains). Monitoring 
questions asked “how much do you intend to undergo” medical procedures associated with 
detecting cancer (stool test, barium enema and abdominal X-rays, colonoscopy). 
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 Participants were also presented with a hypothetical diagnosis of stage three colorectal 
cancer (with a 64% 5 year survival rate) and were asked “how much do you intend to undergo” 
various treatment plans associated with removing cancerous cells (surgery; surgery & 
chemotherapy; radiation, surgery, & chemotherapy). 
Results and Discussion 
 We created indices for intention to self-limit (α = .77), self-bolster (α = .91), monitor (α = 
.87), and treat (α = .90) by averaging the ratings of the respective items.  A 3 (message metaphor: 
enemy, imbalance, neutral) x 4 (intention: self-limiting, self-bolstering, monitoring, treatment) x 
2 (gender: male, female) mixed analysis of variance revealed the predicted significant omnibus 
two way interaction between message metaphor and intention, F(6, 921) = 2.48, p = .022, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.016.  
Self-limiting behavior 
  As predicted, enemy-framing lowered intentions for self-limiting behaviors compared to 
the neutral representation, t(307) = -2.21, p = .028, d = .29, 95% CI [-.96, -.03], and compared to 
the imbalance representation, t(307) = -2.54, p = .012, d = .28, 95% CI [-.80, -.14] (Table 2). 
These differences are reflected in an omnibus simple main effect of message frame, F(2, 307) = 
3.91, p = .021, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .025, which was not moderated by gender, F < 1 for the metaphor x gender 
interaction. Thus, framing cancer as an enemy hurt intentions to limit risky behaviors, consistent 
with the accessibility effects observed in study 1. 
Self-bolstering behaviors 
An omnibus simple main effect of message metaphor for the self-bolstering index, F(2, 
307) = 4.13, p = .017, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .026, further indicated that imbalance framing increased bolstering 
intentions. Specifically, participants exposed to imbalance framing intended to self-bolster more 
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than both enemy-framing, simple effect t(307) = 2.33, p = .020, d = .29, and the neutral 
representation, simple effect t(307) = 2.63, p = .009, d = .30. In contrast, enemy-framing did not 
increase intention to self-bolster relative to the neutral representation, t(307) = 0.40, p = .686, 
indicating that enemy framing does not boost intentions to engage in risk-reducing behaviors. 
This also replicates the non-effect of enemy-framing on self-bolstering behaviors observed in 
study 1. The effect of message framing was not moderated by an interaction with gender; F(2, 
307) = 1.53, p = .218, for the metaphor x gender interaction. 
Monitoring and treatment 
 Finally, the framing manipulations did not affect the monitoring or treatment intentions. 
For the monitoring index, the simple main effects of message metaphor, F(2, 307) = 1.61, p = 
.201; gender, F < 1; and the message metaphor x gender simple interaction, F < 1, were not 
significant. Similarly, for the treatment index, the simple main effects of message metaphor, F(2, 
307) = 1.12, p = .327; gender, F < 1; and the message metaphor x gender simple interaction, F(2, 
307) = 1.04, p = .356, were not significant. 
Table 2. Message metaphor by intention index on mean (SD) behavioral intention 
 Message Metaphor 
Intention Index Enemy Imbalance Neutral 
Self-limiting 3.69 (1.70) 4.16 (1.66) 4.17 (1.62) 
Self-bolstering 4.92 (1.42) 5.33 (1.44) 4.89 (1.48) 
Monitoring 2.65 (1.58) 2.95 (1.52) 2.98 (1.70) 
Treatment 5.78 (1.25) 5.80 (1.21) 5.48 (1.43) 
 
Gender effects 
In the overall model, there was an additional significant two way interaction between 
gender and intention, F(3, 921) = 8.26, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .026. Although gender did not moderate 
the effect of message framing on intentions {F(6, 921) = 1.24, p = .285, for the three-way 
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interaction}, the observation is worth noting.  Specifically, women intended to engage in 
prevention behaviors more than men: simple main effect of gender on self-limiting intentions, 
F(1, 307) = 23.37, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .071, and simple main effect of gender on self-bolstering 
intentions, F(1, 307) = 6.28, p = .013, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .020. However, both males and females had equal 
intentions for monitoring (F < 1) and treatment (F < 1) behaviors.  
Discussion 
 In sum, the current findings suggest that enemy framing undermines self-limiting 
prevention intentions but has no effect on self-bolstering prevention intentions, monitoring 
intentions, or treatment intentions. This absence of a beneficial effect on self-bolstering, 
monitoring, and treatment intentions is both surprising and concerning because it is one of the 
primary reasons cited for the continued use of the enemy metaphor (Reisfield & Wilson, 2004; 
Harrington, 2012) and it goes against the prevailing wisdom that enemy framing motivates 
people to “fight” cancer (Muhkerjee, 2010; Kato et al., 2008; Khalil, 2012). 
 However, research may provide clues as to why the enemy representation only affects 
intention for a subset of preventive behaviors. Metaphoric framing manipulations appear to be 
constrained to the same variables as conceptual priming manipulations (see Higgins, 1996); a 
source concept must be applicable to the target (Jones & Estes, 2006) and its impact increases 
with the abstractness and ambiguity of the target (Jia & Smith, 2013; Keefer, Landau, Sullivan, 
& Rothschild, 2011). Thus, participants may only draw upon metaphoric entailments when they 
are unsure of their intentions, but may not when their intentions are clear. As such, intention for 
self-limiting behaviors may be more ambiguous than intentions for self-bolstering, monitoring, 
and treatment behaviors, creating the observed pattern of results for the enemy metaphor. 
  Our data indirectly bear on this hypothesis. Participants making ambiguous judgments 
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tend to stick to the midpoint of the scale, shying away from the descriptive anchors on scale 
endpoints. In our study, participants rated their intention for behaviors on a one (do not intend) to 
seven (strongly intend) point scale, making a rating of four the scale midpoint. Thus, we would 
expect ambiguous intention indices to hover around a scale value of four, whereas unambiguous 
intention indices would deviate from the neutral point. 
 A oneway within subject analysis of variance on the deviation of each index from the 
scale midpoint (four) found a significant omnibus effect of index, F(3, 936) = 67.15, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .18. We conducted follow up one sample t-tests assessing the extent to which each intention 
index differed from the scale midpoint (four). As expected, intention for self-limiting (M = 4.0, 
SD = 1.7) was no different from the scale midpoint, t(312) = .011, p = .991, indicating that it was 
an ambiguous judgment. However, intentions for self-bolstering [M = 5.0, SD = 1.5; t(312) = 
12.69, p < .001], monitoring [M = 2.9, SD = 1.6; t(312) = -12.59, p < .001], and treatment [M = 
5.7, SD = 1.3; t(312) = 22.98, p < .001] were significantly different from the scale midpoint, 
indicating that these were unambiguous judgments. Thus, since metaphoric framing is more 
influential for ambiguous concepts, enemy framing may only affect intentions for self-limiting 
behaviors since intentions for them are more ambiguous. 
 We additionally observed that imbalance framing increased intentions for self-bolstering 
behaviors. Because we had not predicted this effect, the next study examines if this effect 
replicates in a different sample. 
Study 3 
 The preceding two studies consistently showed that framing cancer messages in terms of 
an enemy metaphor has adverse consequences for prevention behaviors that involve self-
limitation, from avoiding overexposure to the sun to avoiding fatty foods. The theoretical 
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rationale of metaphor framing implies that these adverse effects can be attenuated when the 
target behavior is framed in a way that matches the metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Landau 
et al., 2010; Lee & Schwarz, 2014a). Because aptness facilitates metaphoric processing (Jones & 
Estes, 2006), metaphorically describing the behaviors in a way that makes them a better fit with a 
metaphoric conceptualization should facilitate fluent processing (Thibodeau & Durgin, 2011; 
Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008), which may attenuate the adverse effects of the enemy metaphor. 
Study 3 tests this implication. 
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and seventy-six undergraduates (95 females; age range 18 to 29) at the 
University of Michigan participated in the study in exchange for subject pool credit. 
Materials and Procedure 
 The procedure and materials were identical to those of study 2 except for the addition of a 
manipulation that linked preventive, monitoring, and treatment behaviors to the metaphoric 
framing of cancer.  Just as in study 2, each participant first read one of the messages with 
metaphorical cancer framing (metaphoric frame: enemy, imbalance, neutral) and answered filler 
questions.  
Next, each participant was randomly assigned to a behavioral frame that introduced each 
set of behaviors as apt for the different metaphoric conceptualizations (behavior frame: enemy, 
imbalance, neutral). All participants read introductions to the behaviors that mirrored those of 
study 2 (“The following behaviors are associated with a higher risk of developing cancer” for 
self-limiting behaviors). In the neutral behavior frame condition, the introduction was limited to 
these sentences; for the other behavior frame conditions an additional sentence was added. In the 
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enemy behavior frame condition, participants read an additional sentence on how each set of 
behaviors (self-limiting, self-bolstering, monitoring, and treatment) was apt for fighting enemies, 
while those assigned to the imbalance behavior frame read how each set of behaviors was apt for 
restoring balance.   
The enemy behavioral frame for the self-limiting behaviors expressed that the following 
behaviors “weakened the body’s ability to fight colorectal cancer,” whereas the imbalance frame 
expressed that the behaviors “impaired the body’s ability to restore balance.” The enemy 
behavioral frame for self-bolstering behaviors expressed that the following behaviors 
“strengthened the body’s ability to fight colorectal cancer,” and the imbalance frame expressed 
that the behaviors “improved the body’s ability to restore balance.” The enemy behavioral frame 
for monitoring behaviors expressed that the following behaviors “detected colorectal cancer in its 
early stages when it is weak and easier for your body to fight,” and the imbalance frame 
expressed that the behaviors “detected colorectal cancer in its early stages when it is smaller and 
easier for your body to restore balance.” Finally, the enemy behavioral frame for hypothetical 
treatment behaviors expressed that the following treatment options “help your body fight 
colorectal cancer,” and the imbalance frame expressed that the behaviors “help your body restore 
health and balance.” 
Aside from the additional introductory paragraph framing the behaviors, participants 
followed the same procedure as in study 2 when rating their intention for each set of behaviors 
pertaining to self-limiting, self-bolstering, monitoring, and treatment.  
Results 
 We computed intention indices for each type of behavior (self-limit α = .73; self-bolster α 
= .93; monitor α = .89; treatment α = .90) by averaging the respective behavior ratings. We first 
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address whether study 3 replicates the effects of message framing observed in study 2; 
subsequently, we turn to the new predictions and address the influence of metaphor matching.  
Do the effects of study 2 replicate? 
 The materials of the neutral behavior framing condition of the present study were 
identical to the materials of study 2. This allows us to assess the robustness of our results with a 
new sample. To do so, we assessed the influence of message framing on participants’ prevention 
intentions under neutral behavior framing.  
Message framing again affected participants’ intention to engage in self-limiting 
prevention behaviors, F(2, 57) = 2.68, p = .077, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .068.  Replicating study 2, participants 
reported lower intention under enemy framing than under neutral framing conditions, t(57) = 
1.95, p = .056, d = .60.  In contrast to study 2, however, intentions under imbalance framing did 
not differ from those under enemy framing, t(57) < 1, and intentions under imbalance framing 
were significantly less than those under neutral framing, t(57) = 2.03, p = .047, d = .62.  
There were no effects of message framing on the remaining behavioral intention indices; 
omnibus main effect of message framing on the self-bolstering index, F(2, 57) = 1.59, p = .212; 
on the monitoring index, F < 1; on the treatment index, F(2, 57) = 1.07, p = .351. 
In a meta-analytic analysis of study 2 and the replication conditions of study 3, enemy 
framed messages undermine recipients’ intention to engage in self-limiting prevention behaviors, 
relative to neutrally framed messages; Z = 4.11, p = .004, following the procedures of the 
Stouffer method as described by Rosenthal (1978). Further, enemy framed messages do not 
affect intention to engage in self-bolstering (Z = .25, p = .80), monitoring (Z = -.74, p = .46), and 
treatment behaviors (Z = 1.51, p = .13) in the individual studies or the meta-analytic analyses.  
Thus, across studies, enemy framed messages lessen intentions for self-limiting behaviors while 
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remaining ineffective on altering intentions for self-bolstering prevention, monitoring, and 
treatment intentions. 
Additionally, the effects of imbalance-framed messages in study 2 did not replicate in our 
new sample. In contrast to study 2, imbalance framed messages did not increase intention for 
self-bolstering behaviors. Further, imbalance framed messages lessened intentions for self-
limiting behaviors. Thus, it appears as if the effects of this once dominant metaphor for disease 
have as-of-yet unknown moderating conditions which preclude us from drawing firm 
conclusions. Additionally, populations differed between study 2 (MTurk) and study 3 (subject 
pool) and differences between populations in chronic accessibility, aptness, or conventionality of 
the imbalance metaphor may also account for the inconsistent effects. 
Does metaphor matching improve intentions? 
 A 3 (message metaphor: enemy, imbalance, neutral) x 3 (behavior frame: enemy, 
imbalance, neutral) x 4 (intention: self-limit, self-bolster, monitor, treat) x 2 (gender: male, 
female) mixed analysis of variance revealed the predicted omnibus three way interaction 
between message metaphor, behavior frame, and intention, F(12, 474) = 1.90, p = .033, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.046
1
.  
To diagnose this 3-way interaction, we examined the simple two-way interactions of 
message metaphor and behavior frame for each set of behaviors. There was no simple two-way 
interaction of message metaphor and behavior framing for treatment intentions, F(4, 158) = 1.19, 
p = .315, monitoring intentions, F < 1, or self-bolstering intentions, F(4, 158) = 1.63, p = .170, 
indicating that metaphor matching did not influence intentions for these behaviors. This was 
expected and replicates study 2, which found no effect of initial metaphoric framing in the 
                                                 
1
 Additional significant but theoretically-uninteresting effects: main effect of intention, F(3, 474) = 217.98, p < .001; 
interaction of behavior frame and intention, F(6, 474) = 2.13, p = .049. 
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message on intentions for these behaviors. 
In contrast, the intention to engage in self-limiting prevention behaviors was affected by 
the experimental variables, F(4, 158) = 3.07, p = .018, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .072, for the simple interaction of 
message and behavior framing. Next, we turn to a more detailed analysis of this simple 
interaction.  
Intention to engage in self-limiting behaviors 
 Enemy frame. Previous research has shown that a neutral, non-metaphoric sentence 
about a target concept can be considered to “mismatch” a metaphoric representation of the target 
concept; after reading a metaphoric sentence, reading times for a neutral non-metaphoric 
sentence about the same topic are delayed to the same extent as reading times for a sentence 
utilizing a different source metaphor for the topic (e.g., Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008, study 3). Our 
planned contrasts take this observation into account. A planned contrast pertaining to the enemy 
message metaphor, which compared enemy behavioral framing (match) to neutral and imbalance 
behavioral framing (mismatch), revealed a marginally significant metaphor matching effect 
(Figure 2), t(167) = 1.88, p = .062, d = .52.  Follow up comparisons showed that participants who 
had received an enemy-framed message reported higher intentions to engage in self-limiting 
behaviors when these behaviors were framed as apt for fighting enemies than when they were 
framed neutrally, t(167) = 1.82, p = .070, d = .66, 95% CI [-0.01, 1.79], or as apt for restoring 
imbalance, t(167) = 1.41, p = .159, d = .43, 95% CI [-0.36, 1.72]. Thus, metaphor matching can 
eliminate the otherwise observed adverse effects of the enemy metaphor  – for participants with 
an enemy conceptualization of cancer, describing self-limiting behaviors in enemy-consistent 
terms increased intention relative to describing those behaviors in enemy-inconsistent terms 
(either described literally or in terms of imbalance). 
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Of theoretical and applied interest is a comparison of the above conditions with the 
neutral control conditions. As metaphor matching effects typically only compare metaphor 
matches against metaphor mismatches (see Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008), it is currently unknown 
if metaphor matching effects actually facilitate comprehension and intention over basic literal 
statements. Further, this comparison has applied interest, as it might potentially demonstrate that 
enemy framing has a persuasive advantage over non-framing when behaviors are described as 
apt for the enemy conceptualization.  
 The comparison with the neutral control condition shows that metaphor matching did not 
endow the enemy metaphor with any persuasive advantage. When the enemy frame of the 
message matched the enemy frame of the target behavior, participants’ intentions merely 
equaled, but did not exceed, the intentions under neutral control conditions, where neither the 
message nor the behavior was described in metaphorical terms; t(167) = 0.05, p = .963. 
 Imbalance frame. The planned contrast looking at imbalance message framing and 
comparing imbalance behavior framing (match) to neutral and enemy behavior framing 
(mismatch) also revealed a marginally significant metaphor matching effect (Figure 2), t(167) = -
1.69, p = .092, d = .46. Follow up comparisons showed that participants who had received an 
imbalance-framed message reported higher intentions to engage in self-limiting behaviors when 
they were framed as apt for restoring balance than when they were framed neutrally, t(167) = 
2.52, p = .013, d = .80, 95% CI [.24, 2.07], but not when they were framed as apt for fighting 
enemies, t(167) = 0.41, p = .679. This indicates a conditional metaphor matching effect  – 
relative to literal behavioral framing, imbalance behavioral framing enhanced intention for self-
limiting behaviors when participants had an imbalance conceptualization of the disease. 
 Neutral frame. Finally, the planned contrast looking at neutral message framing and 
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comparing neutral behavior framing to enemy and imbalance behavior framing showed no effect 
of matching on intentions in the neutral control conditions, t(167) = 1.31, p = .192.  
Figure 2. Message metaphor by behavior frame on self-limiting intention 
 
Note. Bars denote -/+ 1 SE of the mean. 
 
Gender effects 
 As in study 2, there were significant effects of gender in the overall model that, while not 
bearing on the proposed hypotheses, still deserve discussion. Also, as in study 2, gender did not 
moderate the effects described earlier as the four way interaction of gender, message metaphor, 
behavior frame, and intention was not significant, F(12, 474) = 1.38, p = .17. 
 There was a significant main effect of gender, F(1, 158) = 20.04, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .113. 
Females had higher intentions for the behaviors (M = 4.5) than males (M = 3.9). There was also a 
marginal interaction of gender and behavior frame, F(2, 158) = 2.51, p = .085, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .031. 
Females had much more intention than males for the behaviors when they were neutrally-framed, 
F(1, 158) = 8.28, p = .005, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .050 for the simple effect, framed as an enemy, F(1, 158) = 6.92, 
p = .009, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .042 for the simple effect, and slightly more when they were framed as imbalance, 
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F(1, 158) = 5.04, p = .026, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .031 for the simple effect. 
 Last, there was an interaction of gender and intention type that was similar to the one 
observed in study 2, F(3, 474) = 3.46, p = .016, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .021. Females had more intention than 
males for self-limiting behaviors, F(1, 158) = 20.84, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .117 for the simple effect and 
self-bolstering behaviors, F(1, 158) = 13.95, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .081 for the simple effect. Further, 
males and females didn’t differ in monitoring intentions, F < 1 for the simple effect. But unlike 
study 2, females had more intention than males for hypothetical treatment intentions, F(1, 158) = 
8.97, p = .003, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .054 for the simple effect. 
General Discussion 
 Counter to the prevailing wisdom’s expected benefits of framing cancer as a feared 
enemy, our findings suggest that framing cancer in terms of bellicose enemy metaphors has 
unintended side-effects that may impair efficient prevention strategies. Many behaviors that 
reduce the risk of cancer require one to limit enjoyable activities, from sunbathing to drinking 
alcohol and eating red meats. Yet, limiting and constraining oneself is not a concept closely 
associated with fighting enemies. Hence, a bellicose message frame that emphasizes fighting an 
enemy may render these protective behaviors less compelling than they might otherwise be. 
Three studies provided consistent support for this prediction. First, enemy framing reduced the 
likelihood that self-limiting behaviors were listed when participants described prevention options 
in a free response format (study 1). Second, enemy framing reduced participants’ intention to 
engage in self-limiting prevention behaviors when a list of prevention options was presented to 
them (studies 2 and 3). Third, counter to the prevailing wisdom, this negative impact of enemy 
framing on prevention intentions was not offset by the increased intentions to engage in other 
preventive behaviors (studies 2 and 3), most notably self-bolstering behaviors, such as eating 
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more fruits or more high fiber foods. Fourth, also in contrast to the prevailing wisdom, enemy 
framing did not increase participants’ intention to engage in effective monitoring procedures 
(studies 2 and 3), nor did it affect their preference for different treatment options (studies 2 and 
3). Most notably, it did not increase their intention to seek aggressive treatments, in contrast to 
conjectures offered in the literature (Reisfield & Wilson, 2004; Aktipis, Maley, & Neuberg, 
2010). Finally, framing self-limiting behaviors as particularly apt in “fighting” cancer eliminated 
the negative impact of enemy framing, but did not provide any advantage over a neutral frame 
(study 3). In combination, these findings cast doubt on the benefits of a metaphorical frame that 
has come to dominate public discourse about cancer: cancer as an enemy against whom we ought 
to wage a war “as aggressive as the war cancer wages against us” (Obama, cited in Lennon, 
2009).  
 The findings are consistent with conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) 
and extend earlier work that showed metaphorical framing effects on sociopolitical attitudes 
(Landau et al., 2009), relationship perception (Lee & Schwarz, 2014b), and reasoning about 
fictional cities (Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2012). However, not all predictions of conceptual 
metaphor theory were fully supported. Most notably, the expected beneficial effect of metaphor 
matching (Landau et al., 2010; Lee & Schwarz, 2014a) was only partially observed. On one 
hand, describing preventive behaviors as apt to fight cancer eliminated the otherwise observed 
disadvantage of enemy framing; on the other hand, an imbalance framed message not only 
increased prevention intentions when the behavior was described as apt at restoring balance (as 
predicted), but also when it was described as apt at fighting enemies (study 3). One might 
conjecture that fighting enemies is one way of restoring balance on a battle field, but this 
possibility merely highlights an ambiguity that frequently plagues metaphor research: as the 
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meaning of any other utterance, the meaning of metaphors is highly context sensitive and open to 
unanticipated interpretations. 
 Although the current research makes no predictions about the time-course of the effect of 
metaphorically-framing cancer as an enemy, prior research suggests the effect would be 
relatively short lived. Metaphoric framing effects are often thought to operate similarly to 
conceptual priming effects (Lee & Schwarz, 2014a), so the metaphoric framing effect might be 
quickly replaced by the next activated concept. However, our messages with very minor wording 
differences were able to affect behavioral intentions, which are reliable predictors of behavior (at 
r = .47 in meta-analyses; Armitage & Conner, 2001). Hence, even though the influence of a 
single metaphoric framing manipulation may be short lived, it may have long-term consequences 
if people can be induced to form behavioral intentions, preferably in ways that facilitate the later 
implementation of the intention (see Gollwitzer, 1999). More important for the present issue, 
enemy metaphoric framing of cancer is pervasive in public discourse, and the influence of this 
continuous exposure is likely to far exceed the observed impact of a single additional exposure in 
an experiment. To illustrate the ubiquity of enemy framing in discussions about cancer, we 
conducted a collocation analysis of sources of contemporary American English using the COCA 
data base (Davies, 2008). This analysis revealed that  two verbs related to the enemy metaphor, 
FIGHT and BATTLE, are among the top ten verbs found up to two words prior to the word 
CANCER. This high frequency of use may ultimately make the enemy metaphor for cancer a 
powerful influence on public health. 
Our findings carry implications for public health messages, which now follow the view 
that enemy framing of cancer, through evoking fear, would increase public adherence to 
beneficial health behaviors. The enemy metaphor has pervaded media portrayals of cancer 
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(Camus, 2009) and information created by cancer funding organizations. Yet, our studies suggest 
that enemy metaphoric language for cancer undermines intention for limitation-related 
prevention behaviors. Further, it does not increase motivation for active, agentic behaviors to 
fight the disease among a lay audience. As such, the evidence suggests that the use of enemy 
metaphors for cancer in public health information does not boost intention for active agentic 
behaviors as intended. Rather, it seems more likely that it hurts intention for self-limiting 
prevention behaviors. Hence, the continued use of the enemy metaphor in public information 
campaigns on cancer may not be warranted and may ultimately be hurting more than helping 
public health. 
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CHAPTER III 
Incidental states with metaphoric relevance guide meaning inferences 
 
 Note. This work was published in Hauser, D. J. & Schwarz, N. (2015). Elaborative 
thinking increases the impact of physical weight on importance judgments. Social Cognition, 33, 
120-132. 
 Abstract. Previous research showed that a book seems more important when its physical 
heft is increased through concealed weights. Do such embodied metaphor effects reflect shallow 
reasoning in the absence of more diagnostic information? To address this issue, participants 
judged the importance of a heavy vs. light book in the presence vs. absence of substantive 
information about its content. Of interest is how participants’ disposition to engage in elaborative 
thought (need for cognition, NFC) moderates the impact of weight. In the absence of substantive 
information, weight did not exert any influence under high or low need for cognition. In the 
presence of substantive information, the influence of weight increased with elaborative thought; 
the heavy book was judged more important by high NFC participants, whereas low NFC 
participants remained unaffected. This is incompatible with the shallow reasoning assumption; 
instead, sensory experience exerts its influence through elaborative thought about diagnostic 
inputs.   
 
A rapidly growing body of research provides converging evidence that sensory experience can 
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influence judgment and decision making in ways that are consistent with common metaphors 
(for reviews, see Landau, Meier, & Kiefer, 2010; Lee & Schwarz, 2014; and the contributions in 
Landau, Robinson, & Meier, 2014).  While the accumulating findings make a persuasive case for 
the existence of metaphorical embodiment effects, many questions remain about the conditions 
under which they emerge. The present research addresses two of these questions: (i) Does 
sensory information of metaphorical relevance to the judgment at hand primarily exert an 
influence when people have little other information they can draw on? (ii) Does reliance on 
sensory information of metaphorical relevance decrease the more people engage in elaborative 
thought about the task at hand? Couched in the familiar language of classic dual process models 
(Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), these questions pertain to 
whether reliance on sensory information of metaphorical relevance is more likely under 
conditions that foster heuristic processing or under conditions that foster elaborative processing.  
To shed light on these questions, we rely on a well-established embodiment effect, namely the 
influence of physical weight on judgments of importance (e.g., Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 
2010; Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009), and a well-established determinant of differentially 
elaborative processing, namely need for cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). 
Weight and importance  
 Many familiar expressions of everyday life reflect a metaphorical link between physical 
weight and importance – when thinking of “weighty matters” we may hope that people don’t 
take them “lightly” and we do our best to bring them to the attention of those whose word 
“carries a lot of weight”. Testing the impact of this metaphorical link, experimental research 
showed that people find societal issues more important when the questionnaire is presented on a 
heavy rather than light clipboard (e.g., Ackerman et al. 2010; Jostmann et al., 2009), that a book 
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is considered more important and influential when its heft is increased through a concealed 
weight (e.g., Chandler, Reinhard, & Schwarz, 2012), and that nutritional information on 
packaged food is considered more relevant when the shopping bag is heavy (Zhang & Li, 2012). 
Reversing the direction of influence,  the same book (Schneider, Rutjens, Jostmann, & Lakens, 
2011) or memory stick (Schneider et al., 2014) feels heavier when people think that its content is 
important than when it is not, resulting in differential estimates of the object’s physical weight.  
 Many psychologists share the intuition that such metaphor effects should be more likely 
to emerge when people know little else about the target of judgment. One variant of this intuition 
assumes that embodied information serves as a heuristic cue, which people are most likely to rely 
on when they have little other information or lack the motivation to engage in an elaborate search 
(Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Another variant conceptualizes sensory inputs 
and their metaphorical associations as one of many target attributes that may enter a judgment, 
suggesting that their impact should decrease as the number and accessibility of alternative inputs 
increases (set size principle; Anderson, 1971; Bless, Schwarz, & Wänke, 2003). Moreover, the 
sensory experience of heaviness resembles other subjective experiences, which typically exert 
less influence when more diagnostic information is available (Schwarz, 2012). Indeed, Landau 
and colleagues (2010, p. 1060) suggested in their influential review of metaphor effects that 
“people will rely on metaphors to comprehend information that appears unfamiliar.” However, 
the available empirical evidence challenges this intuition. 
 Specifically, Chandler and colleagues (2012) observed that the experimentally 
manipulated weight of a book only influenced judgments of the book’s importance when 
participants had substantive knowledge about the book. For example, increasing the heft of 
Catcher in the Rye through a concealed weight increased the book’s perceived impact on 
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American literature, but only among participants who had read the book (Study 2) and knew 
details about its plot (Study 3). Participants who had not read the book were unaffected by its 
weight. Similarly, participants who held the unknown book Dogboy were influenced by its 
experimentally manipulated weight when they were handed the book with the back cover up, 
which allowed them to read a short synopsis and snippets from reviews. The book’s weight 
exerted no influence when they were handed the book with the front cover up, depriving them of 
substantively relevant information (Study 1). In short, Chandler and colleagues’ (2012) results 
suggest that an object’s physical weight only influences judgments of the object’s importance 
when the perceiver has access to relevant declarative information about the object. This 
conclusion stands in stark contrast to the popular assumption that sensory experiences of merely 
metaphorical relevance serve as heuristic cues that people rely on when they lack more 
diagnostic information.  
The role of elaborative thought 
  The present research revisits the conceptual issues raised by Chandler et al.’s (2012) 
findings by taking advantage of reliable individual differences in elaborative reasoning, namely 
participants’ need for cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Across numerous tasks, 
individuals high in NFC have been found to be more likely to enjoy and engage in effortful 
elaborative thought than individuals low in NFC, who are more likely to rely on less effortful 
processing strategies and heuristic cues (for reviews, see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 
1996; Petty, Brinol, Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009).  This makes NFC a valuable diagnostic tool 
for exploring the role of elaborative reasoning in the emergence of weight effects on judgments 
of importance. 
 If sensory experiences of metaphorical relevance serve as heuristic cues, their influence 
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on judgment should be most pronounced when perceivers are (i) low (rather than high) in NFC 
and (ii) lack (rather than have) substantive information about the target.  Whereas Chandler and 
colleagues (2012) did not observe weight effects in the absence of substantive information, such 
effects may emerge for participants low in NFC, a variable not considered in the earlier research. 
 Moreover, differences in elaborative reasoning can also shed light on the processes that 
give rise to weight effects in the presence of substantive information. Three possibilities are 
worth considering. First, people sometimes hesitate to offer a judgment when they feel that their 
knowledge is insufficient. They may therefore only draw on metaphorically related information 
when their perceived knowledge exceeds a threshold of “judgeability” (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & 
Schadron, 1992; Croizet & Fiske, 2000). From this perspective, one’s perception of one’s own 
knowledge is more crucial than one’s actual knowledge about the book. In contrast, Chandler et 
al. (2012) found that actual knowledge about the book’s plot, rather than perceived knowledge or 
expertise, was the crucial prerequisite for weight effects. This renders a judgeability account of 
the observed interaction of weight and knowledge unlikely, and we will not address it in the 
present research. A second possibility is suggested by theories of knowledge accessibility 
(Higgins, 1996; Wyer & Srull, 1989), which assume that contextual influences can only increase 
the accessibility of information that the person already has. From this perspective, the book’s 
heft may increase the accessibility of metaphor-consistent information about the book, making it 
more likely that importance related attributes of the book come to mind when the book sits 
heavily in one’s hand. If importance related attributes of the book are not available in memory 
because the person lacks relevant knowledge, no influence of the book’s heft is observed. 
Finally, research into hypothesis testing (for reviews, see Kunda, 1999; Nickerson, 1998; Oswald 
& Grosjean, 2004) raises the possibility that the book’s heft suggests a metaphor consistent 
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hypothesis (“This book seems important”) that is only endorsed when some supportive 
information can be identified.  If supportive information is not available, no effect is observed.  
 The latter two accounts differ in their assumptions about the role of elaborative 
reasoning. From the perspective of mere knowledge accessibility (Higgins, 1996; Wyer & Srull, 
1989), the metaphorical link between physical weight and importance results in an activation of 
the concept “important” when a person holds a weighty book. This can influence the retrieval of 
previously acquired information as well as the encoding of new information. People who 
evaluate a previously read book (e.g., Catcher in the rye) are more likely to recall important 
attributes of the book when that concept is available, whereas people who read about an 
unfamiliar book (e.g., Dogboy) may encode the new information as more important when that 
concept is available (for reviews of both processes, see Higgins, 1996; Wyer & Srull, 1989). The 
associative process underlying priming effects on the encoding of new information is assumed to 
be relatively automatic and effortless (Bargh, 1994; Higgins, 1996; Wyer & Srull, 1989) and its 
impact is attenuated under conditions that foster systematic processing (e.g., Ford & Kruglanski, 
1995). From this perspective, a book’s weight influences the encoding of information about the 
book; accordingly (iii) weight effects should only be observed when information about the book 
is provided and they should (iv) be more pronounced among individuals who rely on the first 
thing that comes to mind while encoding new information, that is, participants low (rather than 
high) in NFC. 
  In contrast, theories of hypothesis testing assume that hypothesis testing involves a high 
degree of elaborative reasoning (for reviews, see Kunda, 1999; Klayman & Ha, 1987). Although 
people generally prefer information that is diagnostic over information that is not (e.g., Trope & 
Bassock, 1982), they usually pursue a positive testing strategy (Klayman & Ha, 1987) that 
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involves a focus on information that is suitable to support their hypothesis. When asked to 
evaluate the importance of a book, they are likely to search for information that bears on its 
importance (rather than its triviality), resulting in hypothesis confirmation under most 
circumstances (Nickerson, 1998). From this perspective, a weighty book suggests the hypothesis 
that the book is important; participants test this hypothesis by examining accessible information 
and accept it when they can identify satisfactory support. Accordingly, (v) weight effects should 
only be observed when information about the book is provided and they should (vi) be more 
pronounced among individuals who tend to engage in elaborative thought,  that is, participants 
high (rather than low) in NFC. 
The present research 
 Following the procedures of Chandler and colleagues (2012, Study 1), participants high 
or low in need for cognition were presented with an unknown book of normal or heavy heft (due 
to the insertion of a concealed weight). Some were handed the book with the front cover up, 
exposing them to little substantive information about the book (only the title, Dogboy, and the 
name of the novel’s author, Eva Hornung); others were handed the book with the back cover up, 
exposing them ample substantive information about the book (a short synopsis of the book and 
snippets from reviews). This results in a 2 (weight: control vs. heavy) x 2 (substantive 
information: given vs. not) x NFC (as a continuous variable) factorial between subjects design. 
 Previous research (Chandler et al., 2012) predicts that the weight of the book will only 
influence participants’ judgments of the book’s importance when the back cover is up, giving 
them access to applicable information. Of key interest is how the previously observed interaction 
of weight and substantive information is moderated by participants’ NFC. As a first possibility, it 
is conceivable that low NFC participants will be influenced by the book’s weight in the absence 
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of any exposure to substantive information. This would confirm the popular intuition that 
sensory information of metaphorical relevance is information of last resort, which people draw 
on when they lack sufficient motivation. Chandler et al.’s (2012) data are silent on this 
possibility because measures of processing motivation were not included. Second, if the 
previously observed interaction of weight and substantive information is driven by low-effort 
associative processes, it should be more pronounced among participants who are low rather than 
high in NFC. In this case, low NFC individuals should find the book more important when it is 
heavy rather than not, but only when the back cover is up; this pattern should be less pronounced 
for high NFC individuals.  In contrast, third, if the previously observed interaction of weight and 
substantive information is driven by more elaborative hypothesis testing, it should be more 
pronounced among participants who are high rather than low in NFC. In this case, high NFC 
individuals should find the book more important when it is heavy rather than not, but only when 
the back cover is up; this pattern should be less pronounced for low NFC individuals.  
Method 
As part of a larger set of studies, 277 participants (177 female; age range 17 - 23) 
evaluated the Dogboy book (following the procedures of Chandler et al., 2012, study 1) and 
subsequently answered the 18 item Need for Cognition (NFC) scale (taken from Cacioppo, Petty, 
& Feng Kao, 1984) in exchange for course credit.  The Dogboy task was part of an initial set of 
three tasks that were presented in counterbalanced order; none of the other tasks involved 
variations of weight.  The NFC scale was one of two scales presented at the end of data 
collection; the order of both scales was counterbalanced.  Neither of these order variations had 
any influence on the Dogboy task or the NFC scale (p > .27 for all main effects and interactions). 
No observations were excluded. To collect a large sample size, the study was initiated at the 
46 
 
onset of the introductory psychology subject pool at a large Midwestern University, with the pre-
decision to stop when the pool closed for the semester. 
Dogboy task 
Experimenters handed participants a copy of the hardcover book Dogboy as part of a 
product evaluation. The book was either a control copy (420 g) or a heavy copy containing 
concealed weights (645 g). The book was handed to participants either with the front cover up, 
displaying the title, author, and cover art, or with the back cover up, displaying a synopsis of the 
content of the book and snippets from positive reviews. Participants reported their interest in 
reading the book (1 = not at all interested, 10 = extremely interested), how much they would be 
willing to pay for a hard copy of the book (free response), and the likelihood that the book would 
be named among the most influential books of the year by the New York Times (1 = not at all 
likely, 10 = extremely likely). 
Results 
 Standardized responses to the questions in the Dogboy task were compiled into an index 
of importance (α = .47). We summed responses on the NFC scale (with appropriate items 
reverse-coded) to compute each participants’ NFC score (α = .87). 
 We submitted the importance index to a multiple regression, with NFC (continuous), 
weight (control vs. heavy), book cover (front up vs. back up) and their interactions entered as 
mean-centered predictors. As expected, the influence of the book’s weight on judgments of the 
book’s importance depended on NFC and the availability of substantive information; this is 
reflected in a three-way interaction of these variables, b = .035, t(269) = 2.249, p = .025, 95% CI 
[.004, .065], r = .136.  We diagnosed this interaction with a spotlight analysis (Aiken & West, 
1991; Hayes, 2012) that assessed the interaction between weight and NFC in the absence (front 
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cover up) and presence (back cover up) of substantive information.  
Table 3. Projected mean importance by book weight, presence of substantive information, and 
NFC 
 Weight 
 Control Heavy 
Substantive information absent   
Low NFC (-1 SD) -.18 -.03 
High NFC (+1 SD) .06 .07 
Overall (Mean) -.06 .02 
Substantive information present   
Low NFC (-1 SD) .00 -.21 
High NFC (+1 SD) -.10 .30 
Overall (Mean) -.05 .04 
 
 Recall that Chandler and colleagues (2012) did not observe an influence of weight in the 
absence of substantive information.  The present study replicates this finding as shown in the top 
panel of Table 3. When participants were handed the book with the front cover up, the book’s 
weight did not influence their importance judgments {b = .087, t(134) = .787, p = .433, 95% CI 
[-.131, .305], r = .068, for the simple main effect of weight}, independent of whether participants 
were low or high in NFC; neither the simple main effect of NFC {b = .008, t(134) = 1.556, p = 
.122, 95% CI [.002, .017], r = .133} nor the simple interaction of NFC and weight {b = -.007, 
t(269) = -.664, p = .507, 95% CI [-.027, .014], r = .040} were significant. These findings 
replicate Chandler and colleagues’ (2012) results by showing that an object’s weight does not 
influence evaluations of the object’s importance in the absence of substantive information that 
can be brought to bear on this judgment. Going beyond the earlier findings, the present results 
further show that this observation is independent of whether the judge is high or low in NFC. 
This is incompatible with the assumption that the influence of weight on metaphorically related 
judgments reflects a reliance on weight as a heuristic cue that people resort to in the absence of 
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more diagnostic information; if so, the influence of weight should have been most pronounced 
for low NFC participants in the absence of substantive information.  
In contrast, the book’s weight did influence judgments of its importance when it was 
presented with the back cover up, thus making substantive information available (see bottom 
panel of Table 3). However, the simple main effect of weight was not significant {b = .109, 
t(135) = .885, p = .378, 95% CI [-.135, .354], r = .076} and weight’s impact depended on 
participants’ NFC scores {b = .028, t(269) = 2.438, p = .015, 95% CI [.005, .050], r = .147, for 
the simple interaction of weight and NFC}.  At low NFC (-1 SD), weight did not significantly 
affect judgments of importance despite the availability of substantive information {b = -.210, 
t(269) = -1.21, p = .228, 95% CI [-.553, .132], r = -.073, for the simple simple main effect}. In 
contrast, at high NFC (+1 SD), the book was judged as more important when its heft was 
increased through a concealed weight {b = .396, t(269) = 2.361, p = .019, 95% CI [.066, .727], r 
= .142, for the simple simple main effect}. This replicates Chandler et al. (2012) by showing that 
weight influences judgments of importance in the presence of applicable substantive information. 
Going beyond the previous findings, the present results further show that this influence is limited 
to people high in NFC, that is, people likely to engage in elaborative thought, and not obtained 
for people low in NFC. 
Finally, a main effect of NFC indicated that higher NFC scores were associated with 
higher judgments of importance, independent of all other variables, b = .009, t(269) = 2.257, p = 
.025, 95% CI [.001, .016], r = .136. This is of little theoretical interest and may simply reflect 
that high NFC individuals are more likely to value books. The remaining main effects and 
interactions did not reach significance, all ps > .17. 
Discussion 
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 Numerous experiments have shown profound effects of incidental sensory experiences on 
metaphorically related judgments (for examples and reviews, see the contributions in Landau et 
al., 2014; Krishna & Schwarz, 2014). The observed effects are often assumed to emerge because 
perceivers lack more diagnostic information and/or are insufficiently motivated to engage in 
more analytic processing. Challenging this perspective, Chandler et al. (2012) found that the 
weight of a book only influenced judgments of the book’s importance when perceivers had 
access to substantive information about the book, either because they had read the book in the 
past or could read back-cover information.  The present study replicated and extended these 
findings by testing several process hypotheses.  
 If judging a book by its weight reflects a shallow strategy to which people resort when 
they lack diagnostic information and/or sufficient motivation, the influence of a book’s weight 
should be most pronounced for low NFC participants who lack more diagnostic inputs.  This was 
not the case.  Replicating Chandler et al. (2012), weight exerted no influence in the absence of 
substantive information. More important, this observation was independent of participants’ 
disposition to engage in elaborative thought and held for low as well as high NFC participants.   
 Further replicating Chandler et al. (2012), the book’s weight did influence judgments of 
importance when participants could read relevant substantive information in the form of snippets 
from reviews. However, the impact of weight was moderated by participants’ disposition to 
engage in elaborative thought.  In the presence of supporting information, the influence of weight 
increased with readers’ NFC; it was significant for participants high in NFC, but not for 
participants low in NFC. Thus, weight failed to influence low NFC participants in the presence 
as well as absence of substantive information. Put simply, to judge a book by its weight, you not 
only need to know its content (as Chandler and colleagues asserted), you also need to think about 
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it, suggesting that cognitive laziness is not a guarantee for pronounced embodiment effects.  
 Finally, the pattern of the observed moderation is consistent with a hypothesis testing 
account.  From this perspective, the book’s weight suggests an initial hypothesis (“This seems 
important”), which participants test by drawing on relevant content. When such content is not 
available, weight exerts no influence; when it is available, weight exerts more influence the more 
participants elaborate on the available content, resulting in higher weight effects for high NFC 
participants. The pattern is less easily reconciled with a metaphor congruent encoding account. 
From this perspective, the sensory experience increases the accessibility of the associated 
concept “important”, which is then more likely to guide encoding of the substantive information 
presented. This process is assumed to be relatively automatic and an impact of accessible 
concepts should also be observed at low NFC. This was not the case. Future research may shed 
further light on these competing process assumptions. From an encoding perspective, concept 
accessibility should exert more influence when the substantive information on the back-cover of 
the book is ambiguous and allows for different encodings. We did not vary this information but 
presented the actual back-cover of the trade book. From a hypothesis testing perspective, weight 
should influence what participants look for and measures of information search could be brought 
to bear on this issue.  
 We close with an obvious, but important, caveat.  Our findings falsify the popular 
assumption that incidental sensory experiences only influence metaphorically related judgments 
when little other information is available and/or people are unwilling or unable to consider it – in 
fact, we observe the opposite. This does not imply, however, that sensory experiences of 
metaphorical relevance will never exert an influence under low elaborative processing or in the 
absence of supporting information. As decades of social cognition research illustrate, any input 
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can exert an influence through multiple pathways that are rarely mutually exclusive. Work on 
embodied metaphors has so far paid little attention to alternative pathways, which we consider a 
promising avenue for future research. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Semantic prosody guides inferences about meaning 
 
 Note. This work was published in Hauser, D. J. & Schwarz, N. (2016). Semantic prosody 
and judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145, 882-896. 
 Abstract. Some words tend to co-occur exclusively with a positive or negative context in 
natural language use even though such valence patterns are not dictated by definitions or are part 
of the words’ core meaning. These words contain semantic prosody, a subtle valenced meaning 
derived from co-occurrence in language. As language and thought are heavily intertwined, we 
hypothesized that semantic prosody can affect evaluative inferences about related ambiguous 
concepts. Participants inferred that an ambiguous medical outcome was more negative when it 
was caused, a verb with negative semantic prosody, than when it was produced, a synonymous 
verb with no semantic prosody (Studies 1a, 1b). Participants completed sentence fragments in a 
manner consistent with semantic prosody (Study 2), and semantic prosody affected various other 
judgments in line with evaluative inferences (estimates of an event’s likelihood in Study 3). 
Finally, semantic prosody elicited both positive and negative evaluations of outcomes across a 
large set of semantically prosodic verbs (Study 4). Thus, semantic prosody can exert a strong 
influence on evaluative judgment. 
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Why does “work” seem worse when someone causes work for us rather than produces work for 
us? Some might say that produce and cause mean different things, but the words themselves are 
largely synonymous; both take outcomes that are brought about to exist (like “work”) as their 
objects, and both are cross-listed in popular thesauri as being strong synonyms. Yet each word 
seems to prompt different interpretations of “work,” with caused work seeming additional and 
burdensome and produced work seeming like a provided opportunity. Why do these synonymous 
words color “work” with such different valences? 
 Analyses of the co-occurrence of words in text and natural language have shown that 
some words occur predominantly in contexts with strong negative or positive valence (Sinclair, 
1991; Louw, 1993; Stubbs, 1995; Partington, 2004). Frequent co-occurrence, in turn, can give 
rise to the expectation that the context is likely to reflect the usually associated valence whenever 
the word is encountered. These expectations are not inherent in the word’s ascribed definition 
(Stubbs, 1995, Partington, 2004) and are not  drawn upon when native speakers are asked to 
consider a word’s meaning in isolation (see review in Xiao & McEnery, 2006). Linguists refer to 
this phenomenon as semantic prosody
2
, which denotes the covert valenced connotation of a word 
derived from frequent co-occurrence in natural language.  
 Language and thought are heavily intertwined, such that minor variations in wording can 
exact profound effects on judgments and memory. Asking people how they feel about themselves 
leads them to more negativity than asking how they think about themselves (Holtgraves, 2015); 
accidents in which cars were said to smash into one another are recalled as more violent than 
accidents in which cars hit one another (Loftus & Palmer, 1974); and saying Daniel helps X 
                                                 
2
 Additional terms for the phenomenon include discourse prosody, evaluative prosody, and semantic preference. 
Note that the term prosody here is used metaphorically. Semantic prosody does not directly involve speech patterns 
of stress or intonation; rather, it references them. Just as the speech intonation of vowels can depend upon 
neighboring letters, the semantic profile of words can depend upon neighboring words, hence the use of the use of 
the term prosody. 
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elicits fewer dispositional attributions of Daniel’s helpfulness than saying Daniel is helpful 
(Semin & Fielder, 1991). Nearly synonymous ways to express the same information can lead the 
reader to very different inferences. We therefore predict that the valence of a word’s typical co-
occurrences (i.e., semantic prosody) can also influence judgment, affecting evaluative inferences 
and creating disparate valence implications for similar sentences as illustrated in our opening 
example. 
Semantic prosody 
 Lexical priming theories of language suggest that context is key to concept representation 
(Hoey, 2005). Words do not occur in isolation but appear in context with critical links to other 
elements of a sentence (Elman, 2011; Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015). The typical context in which 
a given word appears allows readers to infer attributes of the word that go beyond its lexical 
definition. For instance, the word “cloud” historically had no associations with computers, but 
recent conceptual metaphors associating clouds with remote data storage added a novel 
conventionalized meaning to the term. Similarly, a concept’s co-occurrence with valenced 
contexts may provide new conceptual associations with valence. Indeed, co-occurrence is a 
crucial factor in creating conventional metaphors (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005), fostering semantic 
association (Landauer & Dumais, 1997) and learning (Skinner, 1938). 
One pattern of conceptual co-occurrence with relevance to valence has been dubbed 
“semantic prosody”. A word is said to have semantic prosody when it occurs predominantly with 
other words of positive or negative valence (Sinclair, 1991; Louw, 1993). According to theories 
of lexical priming, the continued co-occurrence of a word with a positive or negative context is 
encoded as part of that word’s representation, which produces evaluative preferences for that 
word (Hoey, 2005; Stubbs, 1995; Partington, 2004) and affects evaluation of related concepts in 
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affective priming tasks (Ellis & Frey, 2009). These findings suggest that the valence of a word’s 
typical context may influence evaluations of other concepts with which the word is presented in  
a sentence.    
As an example, the verb cause has clear negative prosody. Researchers have documented 
that nearly all of cause’s most associated collocates (commonly co-occuring words) are clearly 
negative in valence (for a review of the evidence and statistical techniques for extracting most 
associated collocates, see Stubbs, 1995). In the Corpus of Contemporary American English 
(COCA), a database of English-language text used in media (Davies, 2008), cause typically 
occurs alongside negative words (most common noun collocates within 4 words to the right: 
death, problems, damage, pain, cancer, trouble, concern, disease, effect, harm). In contrast, the 
nearly-synonymous verb produce has no such co-occurrence patterns (most common noun 
collocates within 4 words to the right: results, effects, images, produces, electricity, goods, 
weapons, tons, amounts, films). Other researchers have identified more words with semantic 
prosody, spanning verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. For example, the verbs happen and set in have 
negative prosody (e.g., shit happens, doubt sets in; Sinclair, 1987), as does bent on (e.g., the 
teens were bent on mayhem, Louw, 1993). The effect also appears in adjectives and adverbs, as 
the adverb utterly has clear negative prosody (Partington, 2004). Semantic prosodies are not 
restricted to English and have also been identified in other languages (e.g., Italian, Portuguese, 
and Chinese; Tognini-Bonelli, 2001; Sardinha, 2000, Xiao & McEnery, 2006). However, only a 
limited number of words with semantic prosody have been studied. The literature on semantic 
prosody typically identifies a limited number of words per paper and heavily documents the 
collocational profile of words in corpora in order to validate them as having semantic prosody. 
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As a result, there are no official lists of words with semantic prosody, but the limited number of 
words that have been identified have been extensively studied. 
Semantic prosody and valenced meaning 
 It is important to note the distinction between semantic prosody and valenced meaning. 
Some words have valence at the core of their meaning, which is assumed to be imposed on other 
words in a sentence. For instance, the words right and evil have clear positive and negative 
valenced meanings as seen in common definitions and participants own definitions of the words. 
Right refers to correctness or accuracy, typically a desirable attribute, while evil refers to 
malevolent intentions, a clearly negative attribute. Valenced core meaning is apparent in how 
people define these words. There exist no non-valenced synonyms for words with clear valenced 
meaning. For example, there is no neutral word that can be exchanged for the word evil in the 
sentence “The toy was evil” and still result in the sentence conveying the same information. 
Thus, words with valenced core meaning have no non-valenced synonyms. Valence is at the core 
of what these words mean and is readily identified as such by native speakers. 
 In contrast, words with semantic prosody often lack valence at the core of their meaning. 
In these cases, valence is absent in lexical entries, and participants do not include valence in their 
own definitions of the word.  Unlike valenced core meaning, semantic prosody may not be 
apparent in definitions. Additionally, words with semantic prosody often have synonyms which 
can be substituted for the word and still have the sentence mean the same thing (e.g., “bent on” 
determining the cause vs “intent on” determining the cause). Thus, unlike words with valenced 
core meaning, words with semantic prosody may share a neutral core meaning with other non-
valenced words.  
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In sum, semantically prosodic words co-occur with valenced contexts, but valence is not 
a core part of what these words mean to native speakers, which distinguishes them from 
explicitly valenced words. We expect, however, that these words may nevertheless impose an 
evaluative meaning on related outcomes as a function of their typical co-occurrence with 
valenced outcomes in text and in natural language use (e.g., caused outcomes may seem more 
negative than produced outcomes). 
The present research 
 To date, most studies of semantic prosody are limited to analyses of naturally-occurring 
text, which merely show that certain words typically co-occur with valenced outcomes. 
Experimental investigations of the possible influence of semantic prosody on judgment and 
decision making are missing, which has been noted by critics (cf. Hunston, 2007; Stewart, 2010; 
Whitsitt, 2005). Further, the phenomenon has remained unstudied in social and cognitive 
psychology despite its applicability to impression formation, persuasion, and social cognition in 
general. Addressing this neglect, the current research aims to provide a valuable proof of concept 
by showing that semantic prosody can affect evaluative judgments. It asks: Is semantic prosody 
merely a language phenomenon or can it reliably affect the inferences people draw from an 
utterance? If the latter, what moderates the size of semantic prosody effects? 
As discussed, semantically prosodic words are assumed to carry valence expectations that 
reflect the valence of the contexts in which they typically occur. If these valence expectations 
become accessible when a semantically prosodic word is encountered, they should influence the 
interpretation of material to which they are applicable, consistent with models of knowledge 
accessibility (for reviews, see Förster & Liberman, 2007; Higgins, 1996; Wyer & Srull, 1989). 
Accordingly, a given act should be evaluated more negatively when its description includes a 
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term with negative rather than positive (or no) semantic prosody – even when participants see the 
terms as meaning the same thing and being similarly valenced.  
Note that the latter aspect distinguishes the expected prosody effects from other 
knowledge accessibility effects, where the influence of accessible concepts is a function of their 
inherent valenced core meaning as seen in definitions. In these familiar knowledge accessibility 
effects, explicit valence is imposed on other concepts. In contrast, semantically prosodic words 
do not have a valenced core meaning, but may nevertheless foster valence expectations for other 
concepts as a function of their frequent co-occurrence with valenced contexts. This distinguishes 
the predicted phenomena from standard knowledge accessibility effects.  
Nevertheless, standard principles of knowledge accessibility should apply to the 
influence of semantically prosodic words. Knowledge accessibility experiments showed that 
accessible concepts have more influence on judgments of ambiguous than on judgments of 
unambiguous concepts (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979). Paralleling this 
observation, the expected influence of semantic prosody on evaluative judgments should increase 
with the ambiguity of the described target behavior. In addition, the size of the expected effects 
should decrease with the accessibility of alternative inputs, consistent with the set size principle 
(Anderson, 1971; Bless, Schwarz, & Wänke, 2003).   
 We test these predictions in five experiments. Studies 1a and 1b test whether semantic 
prosody affects readers’ inferences about the valence of an outcome. Study 2 tests whether 
inferences from prosody are moderated by other information about the actor’s intentions. Study 3 
tests the influence of prosody on the evaluation of outcomes. Study 4 tests a generalized effect of 
both positive and negative semantic prosody across a large set of prosodic verbs. Throughout, the 
materials presented to participants differ only in a single, semantically prosodic word. As 
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detailed below, the prosodic words used are nearly synonymous with control words and contain 
no valence associations in lexical definitions -- but nevertheless may exert a powerful influence 
on participants’ inferences from descriptions in which they occur. 
 It is important to note that different methods of measuring word associations may result 
in different estimates of the extent to which people associate semantically prosodic words with 
valence.  Collocation is part of conceptual representation (Hoey, 2005) and people seem to have 
at least implicit awareness of collocational patterns (Ellis & Frey, 2009). Accordingly, simply 
asking for valence ratings of words may show that participants view semantically prosodic words 
as being valenced because participants may draw upon collocational patterns to fulfill these 
ratings. Further, there could be a circular relationship between a semantically prosodic word’s 
rated valence and collocation, such that they drive each other, making it fruitless to discover the 
valenced meaning (or lack thereof) of a semantically prosodic word via word ratings. In the 
following pilot tests, we explore alternate ways of establishing that our semantically prosodic 
stimuli and control stimuli do not differ in the valence of their core meaning. 
Pilot studies: synonymy and valence of semantically prosodic terms and control terms 
 Although words with semantic prosody occur in valenced contexts, the words themselves 
may lack a valenced core meaning. If so, words with semantic prosody should be seen as similar 
in meaning and valence to non-semantically prosodic synonymous words. 
 As an example, cause is often listed as having negative semantic prosody (Stubbs, 1995; 
Xiao & McEnery, 2006), and produce is often identified as being its non-semantically prosodic 
synonym.  Most dictionaries list similar definitions for the words, and thesauri commonly cross-
list the words as being strong synonyms of each other. As shown in Table 4, both words have 
few orthographic neighbors and are relatively frequent in language despite having different 
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collocational profiles. Some affective lexicons specify that both words contain no valence 
associations (General Inquirer; Stone, Dunphy, & Smith, 1966; EmoLex; Mohammad & Turney, 
2013) while others suggest that cause is more negative than produce (Warriner, Kuperman, & 
Brysbaert, 2013). However, as previously discussed, it is difficult to discern if differences in 
participant ratings of valence are derived from differences in valenced core meaning or 
differences in semantic prosody. 
Table 4. Word statistics for stimuli in studies 1 through 3. 
 Cause Produce 
Most frequent right noun 
collocates 
 within 4 (Davies, 2008) 
death, problems, damage, pain, 
cancer, trouble, concern, 
disease, effect, harm 
results, effects, images, 
produces, electricity, goods, 
weapons, tons, amounts, films 
Orthographic neighbors 1 (pause) 1 (product) 
Frequency as verbs 
(COCA, Davies, 2008) 
24,282 (52 per mil) 32,021 (69 per mil) 
Mean coded definition 
valence 
1.9 2.0 
Mean sentiment analysis 
definition valence 
5.4 5.8 
Synonymy in pilot study  19/21 participants (90%) 
identified produce as a 
synonym of cause 
19/19 participants (100%) 
identified cause as a synonym 
of produce 
 
 We conducted pilot tests to ascertain whether words with semantic prosody are seen as 
similar in meaning and valence to non-semantically prosodic synonymous words. Participants 
defined words with semantic prosody and non-semantically prosodic synonyms, and raters coded 
their definitions for valence. Participants also identified whether non-semantically prosodic 
synonyms were synonymous with semantically prosodic words. These measures assess whether 
words with semantic prosody can be similar to their non-semantically prosodic synonyms in all 
but their associated collocates. Thus, we distinguish word meaning from semantic prosody by 
evaluating the valence of how pilot participants define words with semantic prosody and whether 
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pilot participants perceive synonymy between semantically prosodic words and non-semantically 
prosodic words. 
  Unfortunately, the number of well-documented words with semantic prosody is currently 
limited. Although numerous words with semantic prosody exist, extracting them and compiling 
comprehensive lists has not been a focus of linguistic researchers. Hopefully, the observation 
that semantic prosody can influence judgment in systematic ways will motivate the extraction of 
a larger corpus of semantically prosodic words.  
Pilot study 
 Participants. Forty Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (14 female; age range 20 – 64) 
participated in exchange for 50 cents. 
 Materials. From the materials of Ellis and Frey (2009), we selected five words with 
positive semantic prosody (attain, lack, restore, lend, emphasize) and four words with negative 
semantic prosody (cause, encounter, commit, arouse) that contained no valence associations in 
their definitions. Information regarding common collocates, orthographic neighbors, and 
frequency for these words can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. To determine if a word had 
semantic prosody, Ellis and Frey (2009) extracted collocates of commonly-identified 
semantically prosodic verbs from the British National Corpus (BNC), coded the valence of 
collocates, and established which verbs had high proportions of positive or negative collocates. 
We searched dictionary entries for their verbs to determine if definitions contained explicit 
positive or negative valence associations, which some did. For example, while gain is identified 
as having positive semantic prosody, common definitions for gain specify that it takes objects 
that are wanted or valued. From a judgment perspective, such cases are of little interest – that 
words with valenced meanings influence evaluative judgment is well documented (e.g., 
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Anderson, 1971). In contrast, the possibility that words without a valenced core meaning can 
nevertheless influence judgment because they usually occur in a valenced context is novel and 
interesting. Accordingly, we only selected positive semantically prosodic verbs and negative 
semantically prosodic verbs that contained no defined valence in line with collocational patterns. 
This resulted in a set of nine words. 
 We then identified non-semantically prosodic synonyms (control words) for these words 
from thesauri. Matched control words had definitions similar to those of the prosodic words and 
had no entries in EmoLex (Mohammad & Turney, 2013) that conflicted with the valence 
associations of the prosodic words. This gave us nine word pairs, each containing one 
semantically prosodic word and a matched non-semantically prosodic synonym: attain-get; lack-
not have; restore-bring back; lend-loan; emphasize-stress; cause-produce; encounter-happen 
upon; commit-engage in; arouse-evoke. 
 Procedure. Participants were directed to a survey on defining words. A sentence 
containing a target word (either a word with semantic prosody or a matched non-semantically 
prosodic synonym, randomly assigned) was presented, and participants were asked to define the 
target word in a free text response box. For example, for the cause-produce word pair, the 
sentence read: “The drug causes (produces) increased blood circulation in the extremities.” All 
sentences are shown in the first column of Table 5.  
 We then presented a list of six words and asked participants to identify all of the words 
that could be substituted for the target word and still have the sentence mean the same thing (that 
is, identify all synonyms). The list of response options contained three non-synonyms, two 
synonyms, and the matched word in the word pair (the semantically prosodic word if the target 
word was the matched non-semantically prosodic synonym or the matched non-semantically 
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prosodic synonym if the target word was the semantically prosodic word). Response option order 
was randomized. As an example, for the cause-produce word pair, the response options were: 
brings about, leads to, produces (causes), needs, results from, dampens. This procedure was 
repeated for each of the nine word pairs (order randomized). 
Table 5. Valence and synonymy ratings for semantically prosodic words and non-prosodic 
synonyms 
Semantically prosodic (control) 
sentence 
Mean 
coded 
definition 
valence 
Mean 
sentiment 
analysis 
definition 
valence 
Synonymy of 
words in pair 
Average 
synonymy 
with 
synonyms 
System justification attains (gets) 
more power as more buy in. 
2.0 (2.0) 6.0 (6.0) 95% (85%) 92% (90%) 
Steve lacks (does not have) 
experience with this machine. 
1.9 (2.0) 5.7 (5.6) 95% (100%) 92% (85%) 
The electrician restores (brought 
back) power to the building. 
2.3 (2.2) 5.2 (5.5) 100% (100%) 95% (90%) 
Banks lend (loan) money to their 
clients. 
2.0 (2.0) 6.3 (6.1) 100% (100%) 65% (65%) 
Our professor emphasizes (stresses) 
the role of expectations on gender 
disparities. 
2.0 (1.9) 5.9 (5.5) 95% (95%) 98% (90%) 
The drug causes (produces) increased 
blood circulation in the extremities. 
1.9 (2.0) 5.4 (5.8) 90% (100%) 95% (92%) 
Protagonists often encounter (happen 
upon) hurdles in their journeys. 
2.0 (2.0) 5.8 (5.6) 80% (95%) 85% (82%) 
Joshua commits (engages in) 
decision-making fallacies 
whenever he plays poker. 
2.0 (2.0) 5.8 (5.4) 95% (85%) 88% (72%) 
Great movies arouse (evoke) 
complex emotions in viewers. 
2.2 (2.0) 6.0 (5.8) 95% (100%) 80% (68%) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate ratings when the non-semantically prosodic word was the 
target word in the sentence (i.e., non-semantically prosodic word definitional valence, synonymy 
with semantically prosodic word, synonymy with synonyms). 
 
Results  
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 Coded valence of definitions. In order to see if there were differences in valenced core 
meaning between the words in each word pair, we coded participants’ definitions of the words 
for valence. Recall that participants often identify valence associations in their definitions of 
words with explicit positive or negative core valence. If words in each word pair differ in the 
valence of their core meaning, then the presence of valenced terms in participant definitions 
should indicate so. Two coders (blind to hypotheses) rated whether each definition contained 
unambiguously positive (score of 1) or negative (score of 3) elements or if the definition was 
neutral in valence (score of 2). Coders disagreed on the valence of only 38 out of the 360 total 
definitions (10.5%), and disagreements were resolved by a third coder. As shown in the 2
nd
 
column of Table 5, for each semantically-prosodic word and its matched synonym, there were no 
significant differences in explicit valence in the participants’ definitions, all ps > .154. Thus, our 
matched words are equivalent in the valence of their core meaning and only differ in the valence 
of their common collocational contexts. 
 Sentiment analysis of definitions. In order to get another measure of the valence of the 
definitions, we also conducted a sentiment analysis of the outcomes that participants listed in the 
textboxes (see Miner, Elder, Hill, Nisbet, Delen, & Fast, 2012, for a review of sentiment analysis 
techniques and considerations). We matched the words within each definition to the available 
entries of the word norming database of Warriner et al. (2013) and retrieved the corresponding 
valence rating for each word (1 = very negative, 9 = very positive). We then computed the 
average valence of the words within each definition to arrive at an overall valence for each 
definition. As shown in the 3
rd
 column of Table 5, this analysis also showed no differences in the 
valence of the definitions for semantically-prosodic words and their matched synonyms, all ps > 
.254. Thus, our pilot testing assured that each word pair contained no core valence associations 
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in participants’ lay definitions. Participants see the stimuli as being similar in the valence of their 
meaning. 
 Synonymy. Recall that words with valenced core meaning lack non-valenced synonyms. 
If the words in each word pair are similar in all but their associated collocates, then participants 
should identify them as being synonymous with each other. As shown in the 4
th
 column of Table 
5 and as expected, participants identified the words in each word pair as being synonymous. 
Notably, the synonymy ratings of paired words equaled or exceeded the average synonymy 
ratings of each pair word to other synonyms commonly found in thesauri (shown in the 5
th
 
column of Table 5). The lowest amount of average synonymy agreement between words in a 
word pair was 87.5% (encounter – happen upon), which exceeded the average amount of 
synonymy agreement for that word’s other synonyms (84%). Thus, all semantically prosodic 
words and their synonyms were identified as synonymous and seen as conveying similar 
meanings by the overwhelming majority of participants. 
 Furthermore, this pilot study demonstrates that cause is seen as synonymous with 
produce even in positive contexts. We asked an additional twenty participants whether the object 
of the sentence for this word pair (“increased blood circulation”) was a good or bad thing, and 
75% of participants identified it as a positive outcome. This demonstrates the overlap in core 
meaning of produce and cause, as cause is able to convey the same meaning as produce even 
when the object conflicts with the negative collocational patterns of cause. 
Discussion 
 Overall, we find that many words with semantic prosody lack a valenced core meaning. 
Participant’s definitions of semantically prosodic words and non-prosodic synonyms were 
equivalent in valence, and participants largely identified the words in these pairs as being 
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synonymous. The remaining studies use the words assessed in these pilot tests as stimuli. Studies 
1 through 3 focus on just a single pair: produce and cause. Study 4 examines all of the words 
piloted. 
Causing bad outcomes and producing good ones: 
Studies 1a and 1b 
In study 1, we investigate whether semantic prosody affects evaluative inferences about 
an ambiguous concept. As noted before in pilot testing, the word cause is typically followed by 
affectively negative concepts, and thus has a negative semantic prosody (Stubbs, 1995), whereas 
the nearly-synonymous word produce has no typical valence co-occurrences (Davies, 2008). 
Importantly, both produce and cause have no explicit valence associations in their definitions 
(Stubbs, 1995) and native speakers largely consider the two terms synonymous (see Table 4). 
While cause typically occurs in a negative context, it is currently unknown whether this 
convention influences people’s inferences about the valence of whatever was “caused”. If 
semantic prosody affects valence expectations about the target, then an ambiguous outcome 
should be seen as more negative in valence when it is described as being caused rather than 
produced. Study 1a tests this possibility. 
Study 1a  
 Method. Four hundred and five Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (165 female, 2 
unidentified; age range 18 – 62) participated in exchange for 30 cents. We deliberately 
oversampled in this first study in order to reach more than 95% power for a “small” to ”medium” 
sized effect (𝜑 = .2). To be eligible for participation, workers were required to have a HIT 
approval rate of 95% and fifty prior accepted HITs, requirements which are empirically-
established as ensuring attentive MTurk participants (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014). As part 
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of a series of tasks assessing decision making, participants were randomly assigned to read either 
the produce version or the cause version of the following sentence: “Surprisingly, ingestion of 
the substance produces (causes) endocrination of abdominal lipid tissue.” Both cause and 
produce have similar meanings of making things to exist or happen, and analyses of their 
associated collocates in COCA (Davies, 2008) indicates that each verb commonly takes medical-
related objects
3
; thus, each verb is similarly fluent and frequent in the context of this sentence. 
Participants then identified, in a forced choice format, whether “endocrination of 
abdominal lipid tissue” was a good or bad thing. As endocrination is not an actual word, this 
concept constitutes a fictional, ambiguous target. 
 Results and discussion. As predicted, participants were more likely to think that 
endocrination of abdominal lipid tissue was a bad thing when it was caused (72.9% bad) than 
when it was produced (48.5% bad), χ
2
(1, N = 405) = 25.26, p < .001, 𝜑 = .25. Study 1b replicates 
and extends this finding. 
Study 1b  
 As observed in numerous social cognition studies, contextual influences are more 
pronounced when the target of judgment is highly ambiguous (for reviews, see Higgins 1996; 
Landau, Meier, & Kiefer, 2010; Schwarz & Strack, 1991), as was the case for the fictitious issue 
of “endocrination” in study 1a. We expect that semantic prosody exerts a weaker influence when 
the target concept is less ambiguous. Study 1b tests this prediction by presenting a clearly 
positive or clearly negative outcome in addition to the ambiguous outcome used in study 1a. 
                                                 
3
 Some of cause’s medical related collocates include cancer [mutual information (MI) 5.75], disease (MI 4.88), and 
infections (MI 5.79). Some of produce’s medical related collocates include insulin (MI 6.64), cells (MI 3.27), and 
symptoms (MI 3.68). MI scores compare the probability of a node word and collocate occurring together by chance 
to their probability of actual co-occurance. MI scores above three, indicating that co-occurance is eight times more 
likely than if by chance, are generally considered to be interesting (Church & Hanks, 1990). 
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 Method. One-thousand, one-hundred, and seventy-seven Amazon Mechanical Turk 
workers (425 female, 7 unidentified; age range 18 - 76) participated in exchange for 10 cents. As 
this study replicates study 1a and adds two new conditions (for a total of three between subjects 
conditions), sample size was determined by attempting to recruit a sample size three times the 
size of the sample of study 1a. This is in accordance with suggestions to oversample in 
replication studies (Brandt et al., 2014). As in study 1a, participation was limited to workers with 
at least 50 prior HITs and a 95% approval rate. In addition, worker IDs were screened to restrict 
participation to workers who had not participated in study 1a (Peer, Paolacci, Chandler, & 
Mueller, 2012). Similar screening criteria are used in all remaining studies.  
In an ostensible study on semantics, participants were randomly assigned to read either 
the produce version or cause version of a sentence. The sentence began “Surprisingly, ingestion 
of the substance produces (causes) outcome.” Depending on condition, the outcome was 
unambiguously positive (shrinking of cancerous tumors), unambiguously negative (gall bladder 
infections), or ambiguous (endocrination of abdominal lipid tissue). As in study 1a, participants 
reported, in a forced choice format, if the outcome was a good or a bad thing.  
 Results and discussion.  Replicating the effect of verb prosody obtained in study 1a, 
participants were more likely to consider the ambiguous endocrination of abdominal lipid tissue 
a bad thing when it was caused (61.4% bad) than when it was produced (47.9%), for a difference 
of 13.5 percentage points; χ
2
(1, N = 391) = 7.2, p = .007, 𝜑 = .14. We predicted that this prosody 
effect would be attenuated or eliminated when the outcome is unambiguous. This was the case. 
Specifically, participants were as likely to consider gall bladder infections a bad thing when they 
were caused (99.5%) as when they were produced (99.0% bad); χ
2
(1, N = 397) = 0 (with Yates’ 
correction for continuity), p = 1, 𝜑 = 0. Similarly, participants were as unlikely to consider 
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shrinking cancer tumors a bad thing when it was caused (3.0%) as when it was produced (0.5%), 
χ
2
(1, N = 389) = 2.1 (with Yates’ correction), p = .145, 𝜑 = .07. Therefore, ambiguity moderated 
the effect of verb on outcome evaluation, as seen in the significant two way interaction between 
outcome ambiguity (contrast coded as -2 for the ambiguous condition and +1 for unambiguous 
conditions) and verb (-1 = cause, 1 = produce) in a logistic regression predicting responses (0 = 
good, 1 = bad), b = -0.09, SE = 0.04, Wald = 4.639, p = .031, odds ratio = .91. 
 The remaining observations are of little theoretical interest. Confirming our manipulation 
of outcome ambiguity, almost all participants considered gall bladder infections a bad thing 
(99.2%), few considered shrinking of cancerous tumors a bad thing (1.8%), and the ambiguous 
endocrination of abdominal lipid tissue fell in between (54.7% bad).  
 In sum, the semantic prosody of the verb caused (vs. produced) elicited more negative 
assessments of an outcome. In line with theories of knowledge accessibility, the effect of 
semantic prosody was attenuated when participants had more informational inputs with which to 
judge the outcome’s valence. While floor and ceiling effects may have contributed to the negated 
the effect of semantic prosody in the unambiguous conditions, evaluations at the floor and 
ceiling are likely due to the lack of ambiguity in those conditions. Thus, when clues to valence 
are plentiful (i.e., when targets of judgment are unambiguously positive or negative), semantic 
prosody has no effect.  
Another look at whether ambiguity moderates semantic prosody effects:   
Study 2 
 Study 2 tests the robustness of semantic prosody effects across a wider range of behaviors 
and outcomes. Moreover, it addresses two ambiguities of study 1, which are both related to 
participants’ perceptions of intentionality, a potential conceptual difference between our stimuli.  
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The first ambiguity pertains to the role of the actor’s intentions. In study 1, participants 
read that “Surprisingly, ingestion of the substance produces (causes)…”; this sentence presents 
an inanimate agent (the substance) that has no identifiable intention. Hence, the semantic 
prosody of the verb is arguably the only information from which recipients can infer the likely 
valence of an ambiguous outcome – and when the outcome was unambiguous, little influence of 
semantic prosody was observed. This raises the possibility that semantic prosody effects may 
only be observed under very limited conditions, namely when the outcome as well as the actor 
are ambiguous in valence. If so, prosody effects would be of limited relevance in most contexts. 
Study 2 addresses this possibility by varying the intentions of the actor. Specifically, the 
materials described actors who were clearly associated with positive intentions (e.g., aid 
workers), negative intentions (e.g., terrorists), or no clear intentions (e.g., workers).  These 
actors were paired with the verb cause or produce, and participants were asked to fill in the 
outcome (e.g., The aid workers caused ___); subsequently they rated how good or bad those self-
generated outcomes were. In this format, semantic prosody effects would take the form of more 
negative blank completions following the verb cause than the verb produce. If the influence of 
semantic prosody is limited to conditions where an actor’s intentions are unknown, participants’ 
sentence completions should only be affected by cause vs. produce when the actor is neutral, but 
not when the actor’s intentions are positive or negative.  
A second ambiguity relates to the intentionality implied by the verbs cause and produce. 
Although these verbs are near synonyms, it seems that produce might be more intentional than 
cause; that is, that intended outcomes are more likely to be described as produced than as 
caused. This raises the possibility that the results of study 1 reflect an effect of intentionality 
rather than semantic prosody: in the absence of information about intentions, participants may 
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have perceived an ambiguous outcome as more positive when it was produced rather than caused 
because the former term implied intentionality, whereas the latter term allowed interpretation of 
the outcome as an unintended side-effect. Thus, because most intentional outcomes are intended 
to be positive, produced outcomes might be considered more positive than caused outcomes 
because produced outcomes are intended.  
The actor manipulation of study 2 bears on this issue. If intentionality drove the 
association of positive outcomes with produce and negative outcomes with cause in Study 1, 
then manipulating the intentionality of the actors in the sentence should affect this process. 
While the actor in Study 1 had ambiguous intentions, in Study 2, we vary the valence of the actor 
to manipulate whether they have clearly positive, negative, or neutral intentions. If intentionality 
differences between produce and cause account for the previously observed differences, then 
participants should infer that an actor with clearly negative intentions would produce more 
negative outcomes (compared to caused outcomes), as a person with negative intentions should 
intend to create more negative outcomes. That is, intentionality would predict that bad people 
would produce worse outcomes because producing is more intentional than causing. 
 Alternatively, if semantic prosody drives the association of positive outcomes with 
produce and negative outcomes with cause, then we should not expect to see this pattern emerge. 
Rather, if co-occurrence with valenced contexts creates valenced expectations, then intentionality 
should not matter, and participants should infer that a negative actor with clearly negative 
intentions would produce outcomes with more positive valence (compared to caused outcomes). 
Additionally, semantic prosody should affect outcome valence of negative outcomes even when 
accounting for the perceived intentionality of the outcome. Thus, produced outcomes of negative 
actors should be seen as more positive than caused outcomes when controlling for intentionality 
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differences between such outcomes. Note that these two process assumptions do not make 
differential predictions for actors with clearly positive intentions.   
Method 
One hundred and eighty-four Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (111 male, 1 
unspecified; age range 19 - 70) participated in exchange for 30 cents. Because study 1a found 
close to a small effect, sample size was determined in order to approximate 80% power for a 
small effect (d = .2) in a within-subjects design. Each participant received six sentence fragments 
of the form, [Actor] caused (vs. produced) ___. Participants were asked to fill in the blank. The 
set of actors (subjects of the sentence) is shown in Table 6; they were either positive actors, 
neutral actors, or negative actors, and were pretested to have clearly positive intentions, neutral 
intentions, or negative intentions. Each participant completed one sentence from each cell of a 3 
(actor valence: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (verb: produce, cause) within-subjects design. 
Condition order was counterbalanced in a balanced Latin square design, and fragment order was 
randomized. 
Table 6. Actor valence for sentence fragments used in Study 2 
 Negative Neutral Positive 
Actor    
1 The terrorists The workers The aid workers 
2 A giant financial 
conglomerate 
A company A Wall Street overwatch 
nonprofit group 
3 The tyrannical dictator The company 
administrator 
The United Nations 
peacekeeping forces 
4 The mean-spirited 
supervisor 
The new supervisor The kind and warm supervisor 
5 The arsonist The marathon runner The Habitat For Humanity 
volunteers 
6 The sneaky committee 
member 
The oldest committee 
member 
The very hard-working 
committee member 
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Procedure. Participants were directed to an online survey on sentence completion. They 
were instructed to complete each sentence fragment with the word or phrase they would expect 
to come next, and were given the example “The circus clown created…” with balloon animals as 
a possible completion example. Six fragments varied in actor valence and verb and provided an 
open text box in which participants were to input their answers. 
After completing the six sentence fragments, participants rated the valence and 
intentionality of their self-generated outcomes. Participants were asked “To what extent is your 
ending to sentence X (outcome to X) a positive or a negative thing?” (1 = very negative to 7 = 
very positive).  Piped text displayed the participants’ original answer in the parentheses. 
Participants were also asked “To what extent did the actor in sentence X (actor in X) intend to 
(cause / produce) outcome in X?” (1= did not intend to 7 = strongly intended). Piped text 
displayed the actor in the sentence, the verb in the sentence, and the participant’s self-generated 
outcome. Participants answered these two questions for each of the six self-generated sentence 
fragment outcomes. 
In order to get another measure of the valence of the outcomes, we also conducted a 
sentiment analysis of the outcomes that participants listed in the textboxes (see Miner et al, 
2012). This also allows us to assess whether semantic prosody affects the valence of outcomes 
generated, separated from participant’s evaluations of outcomes following words with semantic 
prosody. We matched the words within each outcome to the available entries of the word 
norming database of Warriner et al. (2013) and retrieved the corresponding valence rating for 
each word (1 = very negative, 9 = very positive). We then computed the average valence of the 
words within each outcome to arrive at an overall valence for each outcome.  
Results and discussion 
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Participant ratings of outcome valence. We conducted a 3 (actor valence: negative, 
neutral, positive) x 2 (verb: produce, cause) within-subjects analysis of variance on participants’ 
ratings of the valence of their own, self-generated outcomes. As predicted, semantic prosody 
influenced the valence of participants’ sentence completions, as evident in a significant main 
effect of verb, F(1, 183) = 146.40, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .44, 95% CI [1.03, 1.44]:  Participants 
completed the sentence fragments with more negative outcomes when the actor caused it (M = 
3.21, SE = .07) than when the actor produced it (M = 4.44, SE = .07).  
Confirming our actor intent pretests, there was a significant main effect of actor valence, 
F(2, 366) = 339.75, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .65. Participants completed the sentence fragments with more 
positive outcomes when the actor was positive (M = 5.37, SE = .10) rather than neutral (M = 
4.05, SE = .08), t(366) = 10.31, p < .001, r = .47, 95% CI [1.07, 1.58]. Conversely, they 
completed the sentence fragments with more negative outcomes when the actor was negative (M 
= 2.08, SE = .08) rather than neutral, t(366) = 17.24, p < .001, r = .67, 95% CI [1.74, 2.20]. 
As predicted, the strength of the effect of semantic prosody depended upon the ambiguity 
of the actor’s intent, as seen in a significant two way interaction between actor valence and verb, 
F(2, 366) = 33.11, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .15. We diagnosed this interaction with simple effects of verb 
at each level of actor valence (Table 7). Consistent with study 1b, semantic prosody had the 
strongest effect when the actor had ambiguous (neutral) intentions, F(1, 183) = 193.29, p < .001, 
r = .72, 95% CI [2.09, 2.79], for the simple effect of verb. As shown in the top row of Table 7, 
when the actor had neutral intentions, produced outcomes were substantially more positive than 
caused outcomes.  
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Table 7. Mean (standard deviation) valence rating by subject valence and verb. 
  Verb 
Actor Valence Example Produce Cause 
Neutral Workers 5.3 (1.4) 2.8 (1.8) 
Positive Aid workers 5.6 (1.7) 5.1 (2.2) 
Negative Terrorists 2.4 (1.8) 1.7 (1.2) 
 
Also as predicted, the effects of semantic prosody were significantly attenuated when the 
actor had unambiguous intentions, independent of whether these intentions were negative, F(1, 
183) = 20.26, p < .001, r = .32, 95% CI [.40, 1.03] for the simple effect, or positive, F(1, 183) = 
7.14, p = .008, r = .19, 95% CI [.14, .94] for the simple effect. As shown by non-overlapping 
95% CIs, the simple effect of verb was significantly stronger when the actor had neutral 
intentions, 95% CI [2.09, 2.79], than when the actor had negative intentions, 95% CI [.40, 1.03], 
or positive intentions, 95% CI [.14, .94]. However, even under these unambiguous conditions, 
produced outcomes were significantly more positive than caused outcomes (as shown in the 
second and third row of Table 7). Thus, significant effects of semantic prosody were observed 
under all conditions and the interaction of actor valence and verb merely reflects an attenuation, 
but not elimination, of prosody effects when actors’ intent is clearly specified. Hence, the 
influence of semantic prosody is not limited to conditions that provide little other information for 
evaluative judgments, unless that information clearly specifies the valence of the actual outcome 
(as in study 1b). 
Controlling for perceived intentionality. We also conducted follow-up tests to assess if 
the simple effect of verb at each level of actor valence persisted even when controlling for 
perceived intentionality. We conducted three separate 2 (verb: produce, cause) within-subject 
analyses of covariance, entering two measures of mean-centered perceptions of intentionality (of 
the produced outcome and of the caused outcome) as covariates, on participants’ ratings of the 
76 
 
valence of their own, self-generated outcomes. In all of these ANCOVAs, the main effect of verb 
persisted, all ps < .008, and the means maintained similar patterns (with caused outcomes 
seeming more negative than produced outcomes). Thus, the effect of semantic prosody persisted 
even when controlling for the perceived intentionality of outcomes. 
The obtained results also argue against an intentionality account of the observed 
differences between the verbs produce and cause. Because produce is more intentional than 
cause, an intentionality account would predict that the previously observed differences reverse 
when the actor is negative in valence and has negative intentions. That is, according to an 
intentionality account, produced outcomes should be more negative than caused outcomes when 
actors have negative intentions. Empirically, the opposite was observed. Even for negative 
actors, participants’ sentence completions were more positive when the actor produced the 
outcome than when the actor caused the outcome. Similarly, the effect of semantic prosody 
persisted even when controlling for the perceived intentionality of outcomes. Thus, this 
alternative explanation can be ruled out as accounting for the observed valence differences 
between caused and produced outcomes. 
Sentiment analysis of outcome valence. We conducted a 3 (actor valence: negative, 
neutral, positive) x 2 (verb: produce, cause) within-subjects analysis of variance on the valence 
ratings of outcomes provided by our sentiment analysis
4
. Semantic prosody influenced not only 
participants inferences about the valence of their outcomes (as seen in the previous section) but 
also influenced the perceived valence of the outcomes themselves, as evident in a significant 
main effect of verb, F(1, 71) = 70.62, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .49, 95% CI [0.82, 1.34]:  Participants 
                                                 
4
 Only 72 participants supplied outcomes to all six fragments that were able to be coded by our sentiment analyzer. 
The remaining 140 participants responded with at least one outcome that contained words which were not normed 
by Warriner et al. (2013), resulting in missing data.  
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completed the sentence fragments with more negative outcomes when the actor caused it (M = 
4.68, SE = .09) than when the actor produced it (M = 5.56, SE = .08).  
Also confirming our actor intent pretests, there was a significant main effect of actor 
valence, F(2, 142) = 35.92, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .34. Participants completed the sentence fragments 
with more positive outcomes when the actor was positive (M = 5.83, SE = .12) rather than 
neutral (M = 5.06, SE = .11), t(142) = 3.77, p < .001, r = .30, 95% CI [0.29, 0.94]. Conversely, 
they completed the sentence fragments with more negative outcomes when the actor was 
negative (M = 4.45, SE = .12) rather than neutral, t(142) = 5.01, p < .001, r = .39, 95% CI [0.46, 
1.07]. 
Mirroring the effects upon participant’s ratings of outcome valence, the strength of the 
effect of semantic prosody depended upon the ambiguity of the actor’s intent, as seen in a 
significant two way interaction between actor valence and verb, F(2, 142) = 3.29, p = .040, ηp
2
 = 
.04. We diagnosed this interaction with simple effects of verb at each level of actor valence. 
Consistent with study 1b and participant’s ratings, semantic prosody had the strongest effect on 
outcome sentiment when the actor had ambiguous (neutral) intentions, F(1, 71) = 56.83, p < 
.001, r = .67, 95% CI [0.70, 1.20], for the simple effect of verb. When the actor had neutral 
intentions, produced outcomes were substantially more positive (M = 5.74, SE = .12) than 
caused outcomes (M = 4.39, SE = .16).  
 Also as predicted, the effects of semantic prosody on sentiment were attenuated when the 
actor had unambiguous intentions, independent of whether these intentions were negative, F(1, 
71) = 12.27, p < .001, r = .38, 95% CI [0.23, 0.85] for the simple effect, or positive, F(1, 71) = 
4.90, p = .030, r = .25, 95% CI [0.04, 0.72] for the simple effect. Even under these conditions, 
however, produced outcomes were significantly more positive than caused outcomes. Thus, not 
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only does semantic prosody affect the valence of how participants rate their own outcomes, but it 
also affects the sentiment of how participants complete the sentence fragments. Participants use 
more negative words when describing caused outcomes than produced outcomes.  
 Perceived intentionality. We further assessed whether produce carries more 
intentionality than cause by conducting a 3 (actor valence: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (verb: 
produce, cause) within subjects analysis of variance on participants’ ratings of the intentionality 
of the outcomes they had generated. As expected, participants perceived the outcomes they 
generated as more intentional when they were produced (M = 5.85, SE = .08) than when they 
were caused (M = 4.66, SE = .09), F(1, 183) = 140.04, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .43, 95% CI [1.00, 1.39].  
There also was a significant main effect of actor valence on the intentionality of 
outcomes, F(2, 366) = 24.74, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .12. Whereas the outcomes attributed to positive 
actors (M = 5.53, SE = .10) or negative actors (M = 5.45, SE = .10) did not differ in perceived 
intentionality, t(366) = .66, p = .52, 95% CI [-.33, .16], participants perceived less intentionality 
in the outcomes they attributed to neutral actors (M = 4.77, SE = .08), t(366) = 6.06, p < .001, r = 
.30, 95% CI [.46, .90]. This confirms the effectiveness of our subject intent manipulation -- 
participants associated the clearly positive and negative actors with higher intentionality than the 
neutral actors, for whom clear intent information was not available. 
The two way interaction between actor valence and verb on outcome intentionality was 
also significant F(2, 366) = 19.56, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .10. As shown in the second row of Table 8, 
the simple effect of verb on intentionality was strongest when the actor had neutral intentions, 
F(1, 183) = 111.90, p < .001, r = .62, 95% CI [1.71, 2.49]. Conversely, the simple effect of verb 
on intentionality was less strong when the actor had negative intentions, F(1, 183) = 10.21, p = 
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.002, r = .22, 95% CI [.21, .88], or positive intentions, F(1, 183) = 30.11, p < .001, r = .38, 95% 
CI [.60, 1.27].  
Table 8. Mean (standard deviation) intentionality rating by subject valence and verb. 
 Verb 
Actor Valence Produce Cause 
Positive 6.0 (1.5) 5.1 (2.1) 
Neutral 5.8 (1.6) 3.7 (1.9) 
Negative 5.7 (1.6) 5.2 (2.0) 
 
In sum, semantic prosody can affect the valence of expected outcomes of a variety of 
actors. Produced outcomes were always seen as more positive than caused outcomes, and this 
effect was strongest when information was ambiguous. While the effect of semantic prosody was 
weaker when the actor was unambiguously valenced, produced outcomes were still believed to 
be significantly more positive than caused outcomes, ruling out intentionality as an alternative 
explanation and demonstrating a robust effect of semantic prosody on evaluative expectations. 
Further, the words used were more negative for caused outcomes than produced outcomes 
according to affective word norms. 
From evaluations of the outcome to predictions about the actor: 
Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 showed how the semantic prosody of action verbs guides the evaluation 
of outcomes resulting from the actions. In study 3 we test whether semantic prosody effects can 
extend beyond inferences about outcomes to inferences about the actor. To do so, we presented 
participants with a sentence about a senator who was described as initiating legislation that either 
produced or caused additional work for middle class families. Participants then rated how they 
thought middle class families felt about the senator’s legislation and estimated the likelihood that 
the senator would be re-elected. We predicted that semantic prosody would make “additional 
80 
 
work” seem more favorable when the senator produced it (for example, as if the senator created 
more jobs for his constituents) than when the senator caused it (for example, as if the senator 
placed an extra bureaucratic requirement upon his constituents). Accordingly, middle class 
families should be less in favor of the senator’s legislation when it caused (rather than produced) 
additional work, which should affect the perceived likelihood of the senator’s reelection.   
Method 
 Six hundred and one Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (261 female, 2 unspecified; age 
range 18 – 76) participated in exchange for 10 cents. Because study 2 suggests the effect size is 
larger than a small effect, sample size was determined to exceed 80% power for a slightly larger 
than “small” effect size (d = .25). In an alleged study of semantics, participants were randomly 
assigned to read either the produce or cause version of the sentence, “In his first term, 
Representative Johnson initiated legislation that produced (caused) additional work for middle 
class families in his district.” Analyses in COCA (Davies, 2008) indicated that “work” was not a 
strongly associated collocate of neither produce nor cause
5
, suggesting that each verb is similarly 
fluent and frequent in the context of this sentence. 
Participants then rated how they thought middle class families felt about Representative 
Johnson’s legislation (1 = strongly dislike to 7 = strongly like) and estimated the likelihood that 
Representative Johnson would be re-elected (1 = very unlikely to 7 = very likely). 
Results and discussion 
 As hypothesized, inferences about the senator were in line with the semantic prosody 
valence associations of the verb. Participants believed middle class families liked the senator’s 
legislation far less when it caused additional work (M = 3.0, SD = 1.8) than when it produced 
additional work (M = 5.3, SD = 1.5), t(599) = 16.57, p < .001, r = .56, 95% CI [2.00, 2.54]. They 
                                                 
5
 MI scores of “work” with both produce and cause were under one. 
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also believed the senator was less likely to be re-elected when his legislation caused (M = 3.4, 
SD = 1.7) rather than produced additional work (M = 5.3, SD = 1.5), t(599) = 14.91, p < .001, r = 
.52, 95% CI [1.66, 2.16]. Thus, not only did semantic prosody affect evaluative inferences about 
an ambiguous concept (“additional work”), but it also affected participants’ inferences of a 
related future event – estimates of the likelihood that the senator would be re-elected. Semantic 
prosody clearly functions as an important predictor of how people interpret the sentence and 
make related inferences. 
A generalized effect of semantic prosody across stimuli 
Study 4 
In study 4, we sought to build upon the prior studies by illustrating an effect of semantic 
prosody across many prosodic words. Such results would provide converging evidence for an 
effect of semantic prosody on judgment. We also extended our stimuli set to investigate the 
effect of positive semantic prosody. While linguistic research into semantic prosody seems to 
focus primarily on negative semantic prosody (Louw, 1993; Stubbs, 1995; Partington, 2004; 
Xiao & McEnery, 2006), words with positive semantic prosody should exist and similarly guide 
judgment. If frequent co-occurrence with negative contexts causes a word to elicit more negative 
evaluations in novel contexts, frequent co-occurrence with positive contexts should similarly 
elicit more positive evaluations in novel contexts as well.  
Similar to study 2, participants completed sentence fragments containing semantically 
prosodic verbs (or matched, non-prosodic synonyms) and then rated the valence of their answers. 
We tested verbs of both positive and negative semantic prosody. We hypothesized that valence 
ratings would be in accordance with semantic prosody, such that outcome completions in 
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response to verbs with positive (negative) prosody would be more positive (negative) than 
outcome completions in response to their non-prosodic synonyms. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred workers from MTurk (50 female, age range 19 - 64) 
participated in the study in exchange for 30 cents each. We deliberately oversampled in order to 
achieve greater than 80% power for a larger than “small” effect size (d = .3) in a within subject 
design. 
Materials and procedure. As in study 2, participants were directed to an online survey 
on sentence completion and were given eighteen sentence fragments. They were instructed to 
complete each sentence fragment with the word or phrase they would expect to come next, and 
were given the example “The circus clown created…” with balloon animals given as a possible 
completion example. 
 Eighteen sentence fragments contained the nine semantically-prosodic words (five 
positive, four negative) and the nine matched non-prosodic synonyms from pilot testing 
(described earlier in this article). Each word in a word pair was presented with the same sentence 
fragment, once with the semantically prosodic verb, and again with the matched non-prosodic 
synonym (order randomized). The sentence fragments for the positive prosody verbs (and their 
matched non-prosodic synonyms) read: kids often attain (get); many countries lack (do not 
have); the man’s efforts restored (brought back); you can usually count on co-workers to lend 
(loan); the teacher emphasized (stressed). The sentence fragments for the negative prosody verbs 
(and their matched non-prosodic synonyms) read: the workers cause (produce); women often 
encounter (happen upon); the man committed (engaged in); some words arouse (evoke). All 
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conditions were presented, and item order was randomized. Participants entered their responses 
into a text box. 
 After completing the sentence fragments, participants rated the valence of the outcomes 
they had listed in the textboxes. For each completed sentence, participants were asked “to what 
extent is your ending to this sentence (piped text) a positive or a negative thing?” Piped text 
displayed the participant’s prior answer within each question. Ratings were made on a seven 
point scale (1 = very negative, 4 = neutral, 7 = very positive). 
 Similar to study 2, we also conducted a sentiment analysis of the outcomes that 
participants listed in the textboxes (see Miner et al., 2012). We matched the words within each 
outcome to the entries of the word norming database of Warriner et al. (2013), retrieved the 
corresponding valence rating for each word (1 = negative, 9 = positive), and computed the 
average valence of the words within each outcome. 
Results 
 Participant’s valence ratings. We computed each participant’s average valence rating 
for positive prosodic outcomes (and matched non-prosodic synonyms) and negative prosodic 
outcomes (and matched non-prosodic synonyms). We then conducted a 2 (word: prosodic, non-
prosodic) x 2 (prosody valence: positive, negative) within-subjects analysis of variance on the 
mean valence of these outcomes.  
Recall that we hypothesized that semantic prosody has a general effect on valence 
inferences, such that outcomes to sentences with positive prosody words should be seen as more 
positive than those for matched non-prosodic synonyms, and outcomes for sentences containing 
negative prosody verbs should be seen as more negative than those for non-prosodic synonyms. 
In line with this hypothesis, there was a significant two way interaction of word and prosody 
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valence, F(1, 99) = 291.77, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .75, 95% CI [1.11, 1.40]. As displayed in Figure 3, 
when words had positive semantic prosody, outcomes were seen as being more positive than 
outcomes for matched non-prosodic synonyms, t(99) = 11.06, p < .001, r = .74, 95% CI [0.51, 
0.73] for the simple effect. However, when words had negative semantic prosody, outcomes for 
prosodic words were seen as being more negative than outcomes for matched non-prosodic 
synonyms, t(99) = 13.44, p < .001, r = .80, 95% CI [0.98, 1.32] for the simple effect. 
Figure 3. Mean outcome valence by word and prosody valence 
 
Note. Bars denote +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
Additionally, we conducted t-tests on the valence of prosodic and non-prosodic words of 
each pair in order to see if prosody had a consistent effect across all stimuli. Seven out of the 
nine pairs (attain-get; restore-bring back; lend-loan; emphasize-stress; cause-produce; encounter-
happen upon; commit-engage in) showed significant effects of prosody on outcome valence 
ratings in line with the prosodic valence, ts > 3.74, ps < .002, rs range .30 to .86. However, two 
pairs (lack-do not have; arouse-evoke) showed no significant effects of prosody, ts < .40, ps > 
.691, although the means of the first pair showed the predicted pattern.  
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In hindsight, reasons for the two null effects are easily generated and the usual caveats 
apply. Specifically, lack, while having positive semantic prosody, also has inherent negative 
valence – good things tend to be lacked, but lacking them tends to be unpleasant. This 
contradiction between semantic prosody and explicit valence may have contributed to the null 
effects of semantic prosody for this word. As for arouse, Ellis and Frey (2009) noted that it was 
the least common prosodic verb in their materials, only appearing in the corpus 310 times 
(compared to over 5000 instances of cause). Our own analysis of the Corpus of Global Web-
Based English (GloWbE; Davies, 2013) also showed that arouse was the least common prosodic 
verb in our stimulus set (2,671 instances of arouse as a verb, compared to the next lowest – 
12,314 instances of emphasize as a verb).  The infrequency with which this verb appears in 
natural language may limit the impact of its semantic prosody –frequent co-occurance is at the 
heart of semantic prosody, suggesting that its influence increases with the frequency of the 
pairing of a prosodic word with a valenced context.   
There were additional main effects of less theoretical relevance. Positive prosody valence 
pairs were seen as being more positive (M = 4.79, SE = .06) than negative prosody valence pairs 
(M = 3.48, SE = .08): F(1, 99) = 254.52, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .72 for the main effect. Also, prosodic 
words were seen as being more negative (M = 3.95, SE = .06) than non-prosodic words (M = 
4.33, SE = .08): F(1, 99) = 28.01, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .22. 
Sentiment analysis of outcomes. We computed the average sentiment of the words 
appearing in positive prosodic outcomes (and matched non-prosodic synonyms) and negative 
prosodic outcomes (and matched non-prosodic synonyms). We then conducted a 2 (word: 
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prosodic, non-prosodic) x 2 (prosody valence: positive, negative) within-subjects analysis of 
variance on the mean sentiment of these outcomes
6
. 
Similar to how participants rated the valence of their outcomes, participants also 
completed sentence fragments using valenced words in line with semantic prosody found in the 
fragment, as seen in the significant two way interaction of word and semantic prosody valence, 
F(1, 97) = 142.94, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .60, 95% CI [0.86, 1.20]. Looking at the simple effect of 
semantic prosody at each level of valence, when fragments contained words with positive 
semantic prosody, participants used more positive words in their outcomes (M = 6.21, SE = .05) 
than when the fragments contained matched non-semantically prosodic synonyms (M = 5.77, SE 
= .07): t(97) = 5.10, p < .001, r = .46, 95% CI [0.19, 0.44] for the simple effect. However when 
fragments contained words with negative semantic prosody, participants used more negative 
words in their outcomes (M = 3.79, SE = .11) than when the fragments contained matched non-
semantically prosodic synonyms (M = 5.41, SE = .11): t(97) = 11.65, p < .001, r = .76, 95% CI 
[0.95, 1.34] for the simple effect. Thus, participants not only rated their outcomes in line with 
semantic prosody, but they also produced outcomes with sentiment that aligns with semantic 
prosody. 
There were additional main effects of less theoretical relevance. Positive valence pairs 
were seen as being more positive (M = 5.99, SE = .04) than negative valence pairs (M = 4.60, SE 
= .09): F(1, 97) = 193.17, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .67, 95% CI [1.19, 1.59] for the main effect of valence. 
Also, words that contained semantic prosody were seen as being more negative (M = 5.00, SE = 
.06) than words with no semantic prosody (M = 5.59, SE = .06): F(1, 97) = 57.39, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = 
.37, 95% CI [0.43, 0.74] for the main effect of semantic prosody. 
                                                 
6
 Two participants responded with outcomes for a cell which contained no words that matched the normed words of 
Warriner et al. (2013), resulting in missing data. Therefore, we only analyzed the data of the 98 participants who 
supplied at least one codeable outcome for each cell. 
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Discussion 
In sum, semantic prosody can have a robust effect on judgment. Words with semantic 
prosody elicited more valenced evaluations of outcomes and more valenced word use in line with 
their semantic prosody than synonyms with no semantic prosody. This conclusion holds for 
words with positive as well as negative semantic prosody. 
Summary of effects across studies 
 Table 9 summarizes the size of the effects across our studies. As a proof of concept, the 
studies consistently demonstrate an effect of semantic prosody on the evaluation of ambiguous 
outcomes. However, the variability in the effect sizes across studies suggests as of yet unknown 
moderating conditions.  
Table 9. Summary of effect sizes in ambiguous contexts across studies 
Study and description Effect size 
1a  
effect of semantically prosodic verb (cause) 
on outcome valence 
𝜑 = .25 
1b  
effect of semantically prosodic verb (cause) 
on outcome valence 
𝜑 = .14 
2  
effect of semantically prosodic verb (cause) 
on self-generated outcome valence 
r = .72 
3  
effect of semantically prosodic verb (cause) 
on… 
 
outcome valence  r = .56 
likelihood estimate r = .53 
4  
effect of 5 positive semantically prosodic 
words on self-generated outcome valence 
r = .74 
effect of 4 negative semantically prosodic 
words on self-generated outcome valence 
r = .80 
Note. Effect size conventions for 𝜑 and r are .1 = small, .3 = medium, and .5 = large. 
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 Studies 1a and 1b suggest that semantic prosody has a larger than “small” effect, 
sometimes approaching a “medium” sized effect, on evaluations of ambiguous medical 
outcomes. However, Study 3 demonstrated a large effect of semantic prosody on political 
judgments. We have no empirical evidence for why the effect size increased in this study, 
although we suspect that within the political domain, specifically with regard to job creation, 
cause and produce strongly collocate with negative and positive outcomes, respectively. Future 
research may fruitfully explore how collocational profiles within different contexts may interact 
with contextual cues to magnify or curtail the effect of semantic prosody.  
 Finally, studies 2 and 4 demonstrated very large effects of semantic prosody on the 
valence of self-generated outcomes. Sentiment analyses in both studies showed that participants 
generated valenced outcomes in line with the semantic prosody used in the sentence fragment. 
Thus, this large effect is likely due to outcomes both being completed with valenced words by 
participants (instead of ambiguous words) and then additionally being interpreted in a semantic 
prosody-consistent manner, magnifying effects. In either case, these studies show that semantic 
prosody can exert a potentially profound influence of on the inferred valence of related 
outcomes. 
General Discussion 
 Can semantic prosody affect evaluative inferences? Our experiments provide a persuasive 
proof of concept and affirm that semantic prosody can indeed color evaluative judgment. The 
semantic prosody of the verb cause affected evaluative inferences about the described outcome, 
resulting in more negative assessments of outcomes that are caused rather than produced (studies 
1 to 3). Furthermore, semantic prosody elicited both positive and negative evaluations of 
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outcomes across a set of different prosodic verbs (study 4). It is also noteworthy that semantic 
prosody colored judgments across multiple domains, spanning evaluations of health outcomes 
(studies 1a and 1b), sentence fragment completion (study 2 and study 4), and sociopolitical 
judgments (study 3). The obtained results provide convergent evidence that typical co-
occurrences of a word can generate expectations of valence which then affect evaluative 
inferences. 
 Similar to other social cognitive phenomena, semantic prosody most strongly influences 
evaluative inferences about ambiguous targets. Evaluations of ambiguous outcomes showed 
stronger prosody effects than evaluations of unambiguous outcomes (Study 1b). Similarly, 
semantic prosody exerted more influence on impression formation when an actor’s intentions 
were ambiguous or neutral than when they were unambiguously positive or negative (Study 2). 
This parallels the general observation that accessible knowledge exerts more influence when the 
target is ambiguous (e.g., Higgins et al., 1977) and/or little other diagnostic information about 
the target is available (e.g., Bless, Schwarz, & Wänke, 2003). However, unlike other contextual 
influences on judgment, semantic prosody has escaped the attention of judgment researchers. As 
the present findings illustrate, semantic prosody is a potentially powerful factor in impression 
formation, judgment, and decision making that deserves close attention in future research.  
Our results also have important implications for the field of semantic prosody. Although 
semantic prosody has been widely documented in natural language (Louw, 1993; Stubbs, 1995; 
Partington, 2004), some noted a lack of evidence that the semantic prosody of a word predicts a 
reader’s interpretation of valence in novel contexts (cf. Hunston, 2007; Stewart, 2010; Whitsitt, 
2005). Our experimental results show that semantic prosody can indeed exert a causal influence 
on readers’ inferences about valence, which are reflected in explicit valence judgments and 
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related inferences. Moreover, native speakers completed sentence fragments in a manner that 
makes them consistent with valence patterns of co-occurrence (Study 2 and Study 4). Thus, 
evidence for a causal influence of semantic prosody is no longer lacking.  
Like all research, our studies come with limitations. Most notably, our studies are limited 
to nine semantically prosodic words, curtailing the generalizability of the conclusions. This 
limited number of words reflects that there are no definitive lists of semantically prosodic words. 
One list (Kjellmer, 2005; drawn upon by Ellis & Frey, 2009) catalogs the 20 most positive and 
20 most negative verbs according to their collocational context. Unfortunately, nearly half the 
words on this list are seen as having valence at their core meaning, which rendered them 
unsuitable for the present studies. For instance, the word “grant” is on the list and is said to be 
strongly positive, but it inherently means something positive (only things that are wanted are 
granted). Of the words on Kjellmer’s (2005) list without a valenced core meaning, we utilized 
43% in our studies. Our stimuli are often-cited exemplars in the study of semantic prosody 
(cause, Stubbs, 1995, cited 460 times, and commit, Partington, 1998, cited 547 times) and are 
representative of the words studied in the linguistic literature on semantic prosody. 
More important, using this limited set of semantically prosodic words we found effects of 
semantic prosody on wide variety of judgments through multiple methods. Thus, the current 
studies provide a valuable proof of concept that the semantic prosody of words can influence 
readers’ inferences and evaluative judgments. Hopefully, linguists will continue to refine 
techniques for extracting semantically prosodic words, resulting in more comprehensive lists that 
allow for a broader assessment of the impact of semantic prosody on judgment and decision 
making. 
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 In sum, words that have neither an explicit evaluative meaning nor an evaluative 
connotation when rated in isolation can nevertheless affect evaluative judgment through their 
semantic prosody. Words that predominantly occur in negatively (positively) valenced contexts, 
and hence have semantic prosody, can impose that valence onto a new context.  While much 
remains to be learned about the underlying process, the current studies document the existence of 
semantic prosody effects and highlight their relevance for research into judgment and decision 
making.  
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CHAPTER IV 
A model of inferring meaning 
 
 Humans seem to effortlessly and efficiently infer the meaning of statements in their 
native language. However, uncovering the processes that drive meaning interpretation has been 
neither an effortless nor efficient endeavor for scientists. Many different factors guide the 
meaning that people take away from statements, all of which theories of language must plausibly 
and parsimoniously model. Mental lexicon theories of language comprehension suggest that 
humans possess a mental store from which stable meanings are retrieved (Katz & Fodor, 1963; 
Fodor, 1975; Jackendoff, 2002; Aitchison, 2012); however, studies showing the situated nature 
of meaning interpretation suggest that words meanings are not stable and are instead highly 
sensitive to context (Seidenberg & MacDonald, 2006; Beckner et al., 2009; Elman, 2011; Smith 
& Semin, 2007; Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015).  
The prior three chapters described three different contextual factors that alter the meaning 
derived from statements. Chapter 2 demonstrated that metaphoric framing of cancer as an enemy 
suggests to people that limiting risky behaviors is an ineffective prevention strategy. Chapter 3 
showed that the incidental experience of heaviness produces the intuition that a book is 
important, which guides how a book synopsis is interpreted. Finally, Chapter 4 provided 
evidence that the typical affective context of a word (i.e., its semantic prosody) affects the 
meaning that people ascribe to it. 
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A catalogue of factors that affect meaning 
 Despite their differences, language-focused fields (e.g., cognitive linguistics, 
psycholinguistics, computational linguistics, lexicography, etc) and situated social cognition can 
combine to greatly inform our understanding of how people infer the meaning of words and 
statements. Each perspective identifies critical factors at different levels of analysis that 
contribute to the process of meaning-making. Linguistics perspectives often focus on how 
readers resolve ambiguity in determining the meaning of single words by drawing upon 
attributes of the word (i.e., word-level factors), attributes of the word’s immediate context (i.e., 
sentence-level factors), or attributes of the word’s superordinate context (i.e., text-level factors). 
As language is at the heart of these disciplines, context is most often operationally manipulated 
via words and grammatical constructions. As such, these perspectives lend considerable insight 
into how language itself affects meaning interpretation but do not address the question of how 
situated mental processes that are independent from language affect the process.  
On the other hand, research on socially situated cognition investigates how reasoning and 
judgment are dependent upon situations and contexts. While meaning interpretation is not 
specifically the focus of this research, situations can activate mental states in a person (reader-
level factors) that affect judgment and reasoning by changing the meaning of stimuli. As such, 
this perspective sheds light on how situations affect meaning interpretation but do not address the 
question of how language contributes to the process. 
Thus, these two perspectives complement each other , and taken together, may provide a 
more complete picture of how meaning is interpreted. Language-based disciplines show the role 
of linguistic context while situated social cognition shows the role of situational context. The 
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following section presents a model that consolidates the processes from various disciplines that 
contribute to meaning interpretation. 
Table 10. Word-level factors on meaning interpretation 
Factor Example finding Relevant reports 
Phonemes Bouba is interpreted as a round 
object while a kiki is a sharp 
object. 
Kohler (1947) 
Maurer, Pathman, & Mondloch 
(2006) 
Lupyan & Casasanto (2015) 
Topolinski, Maschmann, Pecher, 
& Winkielman (2014)  
 
Highly accessible 
lexical meaning 
Bird is interpreted as a winged 
flying animal that lays eggs. 
Katz & Fodor (1963)  
Fodor (1975) 
Jackendoff (2002) 
Aitchison (2012) 
Kilgarriff (1997) 
MacDonald & Seidenberg (2006) 
 
Collocation and 
semantic prosody 
Endocrination is interpreted as 
being a negative outcome when it 
preceded by the word caused. 
McKoon & Ratcliff (1992) 
Ellis, Frey, & Jalkanen (2009)  
Durrant & Doherty (2010) 
Ellis & Frey (2009) 
Hauser & Schwarz (2016) 
Hoey (2005) 
Landauer & Dumais (1997) 
 
Word-level factors 
At the most basic level, aspects of an individual target word to be interpreted can affect 
what meaning people infer. Table 10 displays such word-level factors in meaning interpretation. 
Note that words can affect the meaning of statements in multiple ways. First, a word may impose 
a meaning that is associated with the word itself (e.g., the word bird activating thoughts of birds). 
Second, words may also impose meanings on other words, especially ambiguous other words. 
For example, the word changes can refer to a variety of meanings, but the meaning of prior 
words, such as I hate the changes, can constrain possible meanings for changes to things that are 
evaluatively negative. 
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Generative theories suggest that words link to context-independent meanings stored in a 
mental lexicon (Katz & Fodor, 1963; Fodor, 1975; Jackendoff, 2002; Aitchison, 2012). While 
other theories suggest there is no mental lexicon (Elman, 2011) and no single “stored meaning” 
(Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015), most language theorists agree that common patterns of word usage 
point to an often-inferred meaning for many words. As such, words can be expected to cue 
meanings that are typically associated with their use. These meanings may be more stable for 
some concepts than others; for instance, words referring to concrete concepts that are seldom 
utilized in metaphors (e.g. broom) may have more stable meanings than words referring to 
abstract concepts (e.g., fairness; Barsalou, 1982; Prinz, 2002). Probabilistic information may also 
determine what meaning is interpreted, such that readers may infer that a word means what it 
most often meant in prior encounters with it (MacDonald & Seidenberg, 2006). Regardless, to 
some extent, words can be presumed to activate a meaning that is derived from the associated 
meaning from prior encounters with the word, although that meaning may be dependent upon an 
individual’s unique history of experiences with that word (Kilgarriff, 1997). Classic theories of 
semiotics may refer to this meaning as the denotative meaning of a word (Lyons, 1977). 
However, other factors also create meanings that are seldom seen in or inferred to reside 
within lexicons. Collocation and semantic prosody create meaning derived from textual co-
occurrence of a word with other words in everyday language. Collocation refers to word to word 
co-occurrence (Firth, 1957): for example, picture commonly follows the word mental (Durrant & 
Doherty, 2010). Semantic prosody refers to word to valence context co-occurrence (Sinclair, 
1991; Louw, 1993): negative words (accident, alarm, concern) commonly follow the word cause 
(Stubbs, 1995). Some posit that a word’s collocational profile is the primary source of semantic 
knowledge (Landauer & Dumais, 1997); nevertheless, research suggests that a word’s 
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collocational profile and semantic prosody are activated upon encountering the word (Hoey, 
2005). Significant priming effects occur in lexical decision tasks for collocating word pairs 
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992; Ellis, Frey, & Jalkanen, 2009; Durrant & Doherty, 2010) while 
significant priming effects also occur in affective priming tasks for positive and negative nouns 
that follow semantically prosodic verbs (Ellis & Frey, 2009). Additionally, semantic prosody 
affects the interpretation of affectively-ambiguous words. Participants infer that endocrination of 
abdominal lipid tissue (a fictional medical outcome) and a politician’s changes are negative 
when they are caused (a verb with negative semantic prosody; Hauser & Schwarz, 2016). Thus, 
people seem to interpret words by the contexts in which they typically reside, such that 
collocations and semantic prosody are activated upon encountering a word. 
Finally, phonological aspects of words also guide meaning interpretation. Researchers 
have documented sound-to-meaning correspondences between numerous phonemes and 
meanings. Both children and adults consistently identify nonsense words containing rounded 
vowels (bouba) as describing round shapes and nonsense words with sharp vowels (kiki) as 
describing sharp shapes (Kohler, 1947; Maurer, Pathman, & Mondloch, 2006). These sound-to-
meaning correspondences also affect category learning (Lupyan & Casasanto, 2014). 
Additionally, mouth muscle movements involved in the production of speech also guide 
affective associations of nonsense words. Words with mouth articulation movement of front-to-
back (benoka) are preferred over words with mouth articulation movement of back-to-front 
(kenoba) because front-to-back mouth movement is associated with approach (e.g., eating and 
swallowing) and back-to-front mouth movement is associated with avoidance (e.g., spitting out; 
Topolinski, Maschmann, Pecher, & Winkielman, 2014). Thus, even non-word, phonological 
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aspects that couldn’t possibly link to mentally-stored meanings affect the interpreted meaning of 
statements. 
At most basic level of a statement, individual words contribute to meaning in various 
ways. Phonetic properties of words can convey meaning, but it is important to note that this is 
less important for understanding how humans infer the meaning of the majority of the statements 
they encounter, as most statements contain conventional, recognizable words. Words themselves 
activate meanings, although the meaning that is activated may depend upon a variety of factors 
(e.g., the concreteness/abstractness of the word, a person’s history of meaning inferences for the 
word, etc). And, the typical context that a word appears in is also activated when that word is 
encountered. While mental lexicon theories posit stable mental representations that are retrieved 
when a word is encountered, there is ample evidence at the level of individual words that 
historical context and sub-word level factors are important for meaning inferences. Furthermore, 
the upcoming sections illustrate how the context surrounding a given word plays a considerable 
role in the inferred meaning of that word. 
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Table 11. Sentence-level factors on meaning interpretation 
Factor Example finding Relevant reports 
Probabilistic 
aspects of words 
and constructions 
Mandools is interpreted as 
involving locative action in the 
sentence it mandools across the 
ground because the construction 
frequently uses verbs of locative 
action. 
 
Seidenberg & MacDonald (1999) 
MacDonald & Seidenberg (2006) 
Ellis, O’Donnell, & Romer (2015) 
Beckner et al. (2009) 
Hare, Elman, Tabaczynski, & 
McRae (2009) 
McRae, Spivey-Knowlton, & 
Tanenhaus (1998) 
 
Verb aspect People described with past 
imperfect verbs (Keith was 
sipping his coffee) are seen as 
being more intentional than 
people described with past 
perfect verbs (Keith sipped his 
coffee). 
 
Ferretti, Kutas, & McRae (2007) 
Kehler, Kertz, Rohde, & Elman 
(2008) 
Hart & Albarracin (2011) 
Linguistic category Descriptions of persons that use 
abstract adjectives (John is 
helpful) are seen as more 
informative, and the person’s 
qualities are more enduring, then 
descriptions that use concrete 
verbs (John helps). 
 
Semin & Fiedler (1991) 
Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin 
(1989) 
Metaphoric framing Limiting risky behaviors seem less 
effective at preventing cancer 
when cancer is metaphorically 
framed as a hostile enemy. 
 
Hauser & Schwarz (2015a) 
Landau, Meier, Keefer (2010) 
Thibodeau & Boroditsky (2011) 
Morris, Sheldon, Ames, & Young 
(2007) 
 
Contextual 
associations 
between words 
Proud is more positive when it 
describes a person presented in a 
favorable context (Person X is 
proud, happy, and intelligent) vs 
an unfavorable context (Person 
X is proud, boring, and rude). 
Hamilton & Zanna (1974) 
Zanna & Hamiton, (1977) 
Clark (1973) 
Rumelhart (1979) 
Merrill, Sperber, & McCauley 
(1981) 
 
Sentence-level factors 
While words clearly affect meaning, larger aspects of the sentences that contain these 
words (e.g., grammar, phrasing, verb tense, semantic context, etc) play an even more critical role 
99 
 
in interpreting the meaning of words. Table 11 displays such sentence-level factors in meaning 
interpretation. Words seldom appear in isolation but rather occur within a context, and those 
contexts inform the meaning we make of statements. 
Probabilistic aspects of words and constructions play a large role in meaning inferences 
for a given word. For instance, many verbs can take multiple senses (transitive – The man 
collected baseball cards; intransitive – The leaves collected in the gutter) or multiple voices 
(active – The cop arrested the man; passive – The man arrested by the cop was loitering). 
However, the context surrounding these words imposes constraints and guides what meaning is 
inferred. Because causal agents are likely to act upon objects, collected is interpreted in the 
transitive sense when subject is a causal agent (e.g., the children collected rocks). On the other 
hand, because inanimate concepts are unlikely to act upon objects, collected is interpreted in the 
intransitive sense when the subject is an inanimate object (e.g., The rainwater collected in the 
bucket; Hare, Elman, Tabaczynski, & McRae, 2009). Similarly, arrested is interpreted in the 
active voice when the subject is a likely agent (e.g., the cop arrested…) and is interpreted in the 
passive voice when the subject is a likely object (e.g., the criminal arrested…; McRae, Spivey-
Knowlton, & Tanenhaus, 1998).  
Context can also suggest probabilistic cultural knowledge. In the sentence The man 
bought a tie with tiny white diamonds, readers are likely to infer that tiny white diamonds are a 
decorative aspect of the tie rather than the means through which the tie was purchased (cf. The 
man bought a tie with a check) because, in most cultures, people are unlikely to exchange rare 
gems for neckwear (MacDonald & Seidenberg, 2006). Similarly, because of prior cultural 
experience with what shoppers and lifeguards tend to save, the phrase the shopper saved creates 
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expectations of money while the phrase the lifeguard saved creates expectations of people 
(Bicknell, Elman, Hare, McRae, & Kutas, 2010). 
Finally, grammatical constructions can also lend probabilistic information regarding 
meaning by virtue of their typical use. For instance, in the sentence It mandools across the 
ground, readers are likely to infer that mandools is a verb involving some sort of locative action 
similar to walk or move because locative action verbs typically occupy the verb spot in the 
construction (Ellis, O’Donnell, & Romer, 2015). Quite simply, familiarity with language 
provides probabilistic information about the roles that words play within constructions and 
sentences, such that the context surrounding a word constrains the probable meanings of that 
word. 
Verb aspect also plays a critical role in what meaning is interpreted from a statement. A 
past perfect verb implies that an action is completed (e.g., he ran to the store), while a past 
imperfect verb emphasizes the ongoing nature of the action (e.g. he was running to the store). 
These aspects guide what meaning is interpreted from words themselves. Imperfective verbs 
(e.g., was skating) prime thematically-consistent locations (e.g., arena) while perfective verbs 
(e.g., had skated) do not (Ferretti, Kutas, & McRae, 2007). Ambiguous pronouns are interpreted 
as referring to the actor in a previous sentence with an imperfect verb (e.g., Bob was handing 
Keith the tool. He [Bob]…”; Kehler, Kertz, Rohde, & Elman, 2008). And verb aspect of person 
descriptions also affects the impressions people form of other persons. People described with 
past imperfect verbs (e.g., Keith was sipping his coffee) are seen as being more intentional than 
people described with past perfect verbs (e.g., Keith sipped his coffee; Hart & Albarracin. 2011). 
The aspect of verbs contextualizes inferences about their likely associations and conveys 
nuanced information about people.  
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Similarly, the words used to describe people have marked effects on the inferences we 
make about those people. Descriptions of persons often call upon many different classes of verbs 
and adjectives to convey information about the person. Interestingly, these structures convey 
different information about how enduring and informative attributes of the other person are. For 
instance, descriptions of persons that use abstract adjectives (e.g., John is helpful) are seen as 
more informative, and the person’s qualities are seen as more enduring, than descriptions that use 
concrete verbs (e.g., John helps; for a review, see Semin & Fiedler, 1991). Additionally, the use 
of these structures is often reflective of stereotypes; people tend to use abstract adjectives to 
describe desirable in-group members and use concrete verbs to describe undesirable out-group 
members (Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989). 
Similar to the effect of thematic associations between words, multiple words can combine 
to create frames that affect the meaning that is interpreted from a text. Metaphoric framing is one 
such example. Metaphoric frames structure thinking of abstract target domains in terms of more 
concrete source domains (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Landau, Meier, & Keifer, 2010). For 
instance, when cancer is metaphorically framed as an enemy, attributes of enemies (the source 
domain) are brought to bear on thinking about cancer (the target domain). Since limitation is not 
a common way of fighting enemies, this framing undermines the perceived effectiveness of 
limiting risky behaviors as a way to prevent cancer (Hauser & Schwarz, 2015a). Other research 
has shown that metaphorically framing stocks as agents (e.g., The Dow climbed higher today) 
leads participants to infer that price trends will continue (Morris, Sheldon, Ames, & Young, 
2007), and metaphorically framing crime as a beast causes participants to infer that punitive 
measures would be effective (Thibodeau & Boroditsky, 2011). 
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 Simple semantic associations between words can also color words with affective tones. If 
a word can frequently occur in different contexts with different meanings, then the presence of 
those contexts can shape the inferred meaning of the word. For instance, people judge a trait 
adjective such as proud as being more positive when it describes a person presented in a 
favorable context (e.g., Person X is proud, happy, and intelligent) rather than a person presented 
in an unfavorable context (e.g., Person X is proud, boring, and rude; Hamilton & Zanna, 1974; 
Zanna & Hamiton, 1977). Furthermore, different core features (i.e., meanings) for the word 
piano are activating depending on the context; music is activated when the context suggests 
playing it (e.g., The man played the piano) while heaviness is activated when the context 
suggests moving it (e.g., The man moved the piano; Merrill, Sperber, & McCauley, 1981). 
Literal and metaphorical meanings are also determined via context (Clark, 1973; Rumelhart, 
1979). For instance, the phrase your car is warm most likely refers to the temperature of the car, 
while the phrase your grandmother is warm most likely refers to the friendly demeanor of the 
grandmother. Thus, semantic associations with context words can guide what features of a given 
word are highlighted. 
 Humans learn language from exposure to the statements and utterances of others. As 
these statements place words into context, it seems obvious that the adjacent words and 
constructions that surround a given word are critical to determining the meaning of that word. 
Context words and constructions place probabilistic constraints upon the potential meanings of a 
word. Verb aspect implies information about the nature of an event. Linguistic categories relate 
information about a person’s characteristics. Metaphoric framing brings attributes of unrelated 
concepts to bear upon target words. And contextual associations between words determine what 
features of target word are highlighted. While mental lexicon theories posit that words link to 
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stable stored representations, the ample evidence highlighted here demonstrates how words have 
wide ranges of meaning, and sentence-level context is critical to selecting the appropriate one. 
Table 12. Text-level factors on meaning interpretation 
Factor Example finding Relevant reports 
Text genre Cause has less negative 
connotations in scientific reports 
than in news articles. 
 
Swales (1990) 
Holmes (1997) 
Groom (2005) 
 
Text position Fresh emphasizes novelty of 
events (rather than resources) 
when in beginning of news 
articles. 
 
O’Donnell, Scott, Mahlberg, & 
Hoey (2012) 
Hoey & O’Donnell (2015) 
 
 
Text-level factors 
While aspects of the text adjacent to a word can affect its interpretation, features of the 
entire text in which a word resides can affect what meaning is associated with a word. Table 12 
displays such text-level factors in meaning interpretation. Even though there is currently little 
(but growing) research on such factors, they echo a similar theme from the prior sections – 
namely, words tend to occur within certain contexts which inform their meaning. 
The genre of a text can alter the interpreted meaning of a given word. Genres identify the 
typical structure and tendencies within a given text. For instance, the introduction section of a 
research article typically goes from general to specific while vice versa for fiction. Recipes tend 
to present information within chronological order while technical reports posit problems and 
solutions (Swales, 1990). A word or phrase may appear with equal frequency in different genres, 
but have different purposes and collocational profiles within each (Kilgarriff, 1997). These text 
genre tendencies place words into a context that informs their meaning (Swales, 1990; Holmes, 
1997; Groom, 2005). For example, because scientific articles are concerned with cause-effect 
relationships, the word cause might only specify a connection between a construct and an 
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outcome in this literature. However, because newspaper articles are concerned with informing 
readers on negative consequences, the word cause might have more a more negative connotation 
in this literature because of its association with predominantly negative outcomes. 
New research is also beginning to uncover how the position of a word within a text (i.e., 
whether it appears near the beginning or end of a text) can constrain the possible meanings of 
that word. Because texts within a genre all tend to follow a similar thematic pattern from 
beginning to end (Swales, 1990), the position of a word within the text is important for 
understanding what meaning that word conveys (Hoey & O’Donnell, 2015). For instance, within 
newspaper articles the word fresh tends to occur in the beginning of the article with a 
metaphorical meaning predominantly relating to the novelty of an event (e.g., fresh controversy, 
fresh blow) rather than referring to the novelty of a food or resource (e.g., fresh fruit, fresh water; 
O’Donnell, Scott, Mahlberg, & Hoey, 2012). Thus, the position of a word within a text can have 
implications for its inferred meaning. 
The texts within which words appear have implications for the inferred meanings of 
words. Because different genres place words in different contexts, words naturally take on 
different meanings across genres. And because texts within a genre tend to follow a certain 
thematic pattern from the beginning to the end of a text, the position of the word within a genre-
specific text serves a purpose that constrains its meaning. Text-level factors demonstrate another 
way in which patterns of language use determine how context contributes to meaning. 
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Table 13. Reader-level factors on meaning interpretation 
Factor Example finding Relevant reports 
Incidental states 
and mindsets 
  
Category 
accessibility 
Character who is ambiguously 
hostile in vignette seems more 
hostile when hostility is rendered 
accessible in prior task. 
 
Higgins, Rholes, & Jones (1977) 
Srull & Wyer (1979) 
Sensory states 
with 
metaphoric 
relevance 
Supportive information about 
importance of book is interpreted 
as being more indicative of 
importance when book is heavy 
and participant is thinking 
elaboratively. 
 
Chandler, Reinhard, & Schwarz 
(2012) 
Hauser & Schwarz (2015b) 
Williams & Bargh (2008) 
Acerman, Nocera, & Bargh (2009) 
Processing 
fluency 
Statements like Osorno is a city in 
Chile seem more true when 
perceptually fluent. 
Reber & Schwarz (1999) 
Weaver, Garcia, Schwarz, & 
Miller (2007) 
Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon 
(2007) 
Song & Schwarz (2009) 
 
Emotions Other people seem more 
responsible for a negative 
situation when participant is 
angry while uncontrollable 
situational forces seem more 
responsible when participant is 
sad. 
Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards 
(1993) 
Conversational 
norms 
  
Category labels When asked how successful they 
have been in life, respondents 
report higher success when the 
scale runs from -5 to +5 rather 
than from 0 to 10.  
 
Schwarz, Knauper, Hippler, 
Noelle-Neumann, & Clark 
(1991) 
Schwarz, Grayson, & Knauper 
(1998) 
Scale range When asked how often they felt 
really annoyed, participants 
given low-frequency scales 
recall more high-intensity 
annoyance experiences than 
participants given high-
frequency scales. 
Schwarz, Strack, Muller, & 
Chassein (1988) 
Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch, & 
Strack (1985) 
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Prior question 
context 
Participants oppose a fictitious 
Data Sharing Act when the prior 
question refers to the 
government’s mass collection of 
citizens’ private emails and 
browsing history. 
Strack, Schwarz, and Wänke 
(1991) 
Hauser, Sunderrajan, Natarajan, & 
Schwarz (2016) 
Motivations Articles in favor of or opposed to 
capital punishment are less 
persuasive when they counter 
participant’s pre-existing 
attitudes 
Lord, Ross, & Lepper (1979) 
Kunda (1990) 
Boroditsky & Ramscar (2002) 
Level of processing Individuals who think 
elaboratively (vs heuristically) 
are more persuaded by strong 
arguments and more dissuaded 
by weak arguments 
Cacioppo & Petty (1982) 
Petty & Cacioppo (1986) 
Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack 
(1990) 
 
Reader-level factors 
Situated social cognition research often demonstrates how aspects of a person’s situation 
affect his/her judgments and decisions (Smith & Semin, 2004; Smith & Semin, 2007; Schwarz, 
1994). Those situational factors often affect judgment by altering the mental representation that 
is derived from text. Table 13 displays such reader-level factors in meaning interpretation. Note 
that these factors need not be evoked by aspects of related words and statements; while some of 
them can be operationally manipulated this way, they can also be manipulated via exposure to 
unrelated words, statements, and stimuli. Therefore, I label these reader-level factors because 
they are situational factors that activate mental states in the reader that then contextualizes the 
meaning interpreted from words and statements. 
 Incidental states and mindsets. Many states and mindsets that a person holds while 
reading text are incidental to the words being read. That is, they are not produced by the text and 
should have no relevance to it or how it is interpreted. However, decades of research have 
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demonstrated that these states and mindsets actually do affect the mental representations formed 
from text. 
Conceptual accessibility describes the level of activation of a particular concept in a 
person’s mind. Recently activated concepts are more accessible and are on the mind more than 
non-recently activated concepts. Interestingly, highly accessible concepts guide the inferred 
meaning of statements that are relevant to the accessible concept. For instance, participants infer 
that a character who is ambiguously hostile in a vignette is actually more hostile when hostility is 
rendered accessible in prior unrelated word-stem completion task (Srull & Wyer, 1979). This 
hallmark social cognition effect has guided decades of research (Bargh, 2006), and importantly 
demonstrates that what is on the mind affects what we infer. 
 Sensory states with metaphoric relevance have similar effects on inferences of meaning. 
Metaphors often link abstract concepts to concrete domains, and some argue that all abstract 
thought is inherently metaphorical (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Recent research has demonstrated 
that incidental sensory states can activate metaphorically-linked abstract concepts, affecting 
judgement in a similar manner as conceptual accessibility does (for reviews, see Landau, Meier, 
& Keifer, 2010; Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, 2012). For instance, as importance is often 
described as physical heaviness (e.g., his opinion carries weight), the physical sensation of 
heaviness also conveys information about importance. Supportive information about the 
importance of a book is interpreted as being more indicative of its importance when the book is 
heavy (Chandler, Reinhard, & Schwarz, 2012) and when participants are thinking elaboratively 
(Hauser & Schwarz, 2015b). Analogous studies have shown that participants interpret 
personality profiles to be more friendly when feeling the sensory state of warmth (Williams & 
Bargh, 2008), participants see an interaction as being more difficult when feeling rough textures 
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(Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2009), and participants infer that an employee is more rigid in 
negotiations when feeling tactile hardness (Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2009). 
 Processing fluency also affects the mental representations that are derived from text. 
Processing fluency refers to the metacognitive ease or difficulty in mental processing that occurs 
while someone is reading statements and making judgments (Schwarz, 2004). Readers draw 
upon this feeling of ease or difficulty to make inferences about the meaning conveyed by a 
statement. For instance, statements like Osorno is a city in Chile seem more false when figure-
ground contrast makes them difficult to read and perceptually disfluent (Reber & Schwarz, 
1999). Recipes also seem more difficult when presented in a difficult-to-read font (Song & 
Schwarz, 2008) and food additives seem more dangerous when they are difficult to pronounce 
(Song & Schwarz, 2009). Metacognitive ease or difficulty contextualizes the inferences derived 
from statements. 
 Finally, emotions clearly affect how people interpret ambiguous situations and 
statements. It is commonly assumed that a bad mood may carry over and cause a person to see 
ambiguous events more negatively (e.g., other drivers may seem more “aggressive”). While 
research has shown many ways that positive or negative moods may affect judgments (for a 
review see Schwarz, 2012), incidental emotions themselves also affect how people interpret 
statements. For instance, participants induced to feel angry see other people as being more 
responsible for a negative situation in a vignette whereas participants induced to feel sad see 
uncontrollable situational forces as being more responsible (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 
1992). Because anger involves appraisals of other-agency and sadness involves appraisals of 
situational-agency, these emotions direct attention to these respective factors in the vignette, 
creating different interpreted meanings and prompting these differential attributions of blame. 
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 Conversational norms. In everyday life, conversations follow a cooperation principle 
(Grice, 1975). Listeners assume that speakers are informative, relevant, and clear, and listeners 
draw upon contextual aspects of words and statements to make inferences about meaning (for 
reviews see Clark & Clark, 1977; Schwarz, 1994, 1996). For instance, Grice’s maxim of quantity 
states that people only give as much information as is needed in a conversation and no more 
(Grice, 1975). In a conversation between two people, one may remark that he lives downtown. In 
the context of the conversation and Grice’s maxims, the listener will likely conclude much from 
that simple utterance, inferring that the speaker has a residence in the downtown neighborhood 
of the current city in which they are having a conversation. This maxim allows context to 
contribute much to the meaning of statements. 
While these norms are most applicable to conversations, they have been extensively 
studied in the context of survey design. These same conversational norms are brought to research 
settings, as research participants consider all elements of written materials to be relevant to their 
task. These elements include formal features of questionnaire design, from scale format to 
graphics and question wording. As a result, many technical aspects of questionnaires become a 
source of information that respondents systematically use to make sense of what is asked of them 
(for reviews, see Conrad, Schober, & Schwarz, 2014; Schwarz, 1994, 1996). 
 One such effect demonstrates that category labels change the meaning inferred from the 
response options for a question. When asked how successful they have been in life, respondents 
report higher success when the 11-point scale runs from -5 (not at all successful) to +5 
(extremely successful) rather than from 0 (not at all successful) to 10 (extremely successful). In 
the bipolar -5 to +5 format, participants infer that ratings from -5 to -1, the lower half of the 
scale, correspond to the presence of life failures while the unipolar 0 to 10 format covers only 
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differential degrees of success (Schwarz, Knauper, Hippler, Noelle-Neumann, & Clark, 1991). 
These different scale labels convey different meanings, and because life failures are less common 
than a lack of success, these scale labels produce different responses. 
Another Gricean effect demonstrates that scale ranges also convey information about the 
intended meaning of ambiguous concepts within questions. Participants asked how often they 
felt “really annoyed” must determine what type of annoying events the researcher is interested 
in: major events that happen rarely (e.g., a loss of income) or minor events that happen daily 
(e.g.,  traffic on one’s commute)? Participants draw upon scale ranges for clarification. When 
given low frequency scales ranging from several times a year to less than once every 3 months, 
participants interpret the question as asking about major, rare annoying events and recall more 
annoying events compared to those given high frequency scales ranging from several times a day 
to less than once a week (Schwarz et al., 1988). Scale ranges provide context that guide the 
interpreted meaning of questions. 
Finally, in line with Grice’s maxim of relevance, participants also draw upon prior 
questions to infer the meaning of ambiguous questions (Strack, Schwarz, and Wänke, 1991). In a 
recent study, participants were more likely to oppose a fictitious Data Sharing Act when the prior 
question referred to the government’s mass collection of citizens’ private emails and browsing 
history rather than when the prior question referred to Google’s decision to grant users control 
over their personal data (Hauser, Sunderrajan, Natarajan, & Schwarz, 2016). Participants assume 
that researchers are asking questions that logically cohere, drawing upon the prior question to 
interpret the meaning of the Data Sharing Act and associating it with a negative meaning in one 
case and a positive meaning in another. 
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 Motivations. A person’s motivations and goals can alter the meaning he/she interprets 
from a statement. Motivations drive a person to achieve a desired end state and are often used to 
explain the reasoning behind a person’s behavior (Ryan & Deci, 2000). However, reasoning can 
also be motivated and biased in order to achieve desired conclusions. A person’s motivations can 
direct processing of information in ways that alter the meaning that is interpreted. For instance, 
Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) asked participants who were either for or against the death 
penalty to read articles that were in favor of or opposed to capital punishment. Participants found 
articles less persuasive when they ran counter to their pre-existing attitude toward the death 
penalty. Other studies have documented numerous domains where desired outcomes motivate 
people to reach different meanings from reading the same text (for a review, see Kunda, 1990). 
Progress towards goals can also affect what meaning is interpreted. The phrase next 
Wednesday’s event has been rescheduled and moved forward two days can be interpreted in two 
ways. One interpretation assumes that individuals move forward toward the future, which 
suggests the event moves forward into the future to Friday. Another interpretation assumes that 
future events come toward the person in the present, which suggests that the future event moves 
forward toward the present to Monday (Boroditsky, 2000). People’s progress toward their goals 
affects what they interpret “forward” to mean. People who have moved forward to their goal by 
almost reaching the end of a long lunch line are more likely to respond Friday to the 
rescheduling question than people who are at the back of the lunch line (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 
Study 2, 2002). Additionally, people with travel goals who had either just arrived or were about 
to depart from an airport are more likely to respond Friday than people with receiving goals who 
were waiting to pick up passengers (Boroditsky & Ramscar, Study 3, 2002). Thus, goals and 
motivations can change how you interpret the meaning of words and statements. 
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 Processing style. The processing style that a person uses to engage with a text can affect 
what meaning is interpreted. Research has examined dual process models for how less 
processing (heuristic, peripheral, type 1) vs more processing (elaborative, central, type 2) can 
alter the conclusions that people draw from messages (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken, 1987; 
Kahneman, 2011). In general, individuals who think elaboratively (vs heuristically) are more 
persuaded by strong arguments and more dissuaded by weak arguments (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). Importantly, many different variables can influence what kind of processing a person will 
adopt. Some people tend to enjoy thinking elaboratively while others don’t (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982). Personally-involving issues tend to evoke more elaborative thinking (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1979). Negative moods tend to evoke more elaborative processing of messages (Bless, Bohner, 
Schwarz, & Strack, 1990). Regardless of the source of processing style, people who think 
elaboratively often draw different meanings about text information than people who think 
heuristically. 
 Summary. Some models of language comprehension posit that words produce mental 
states in the reader which then constrain the mental states that future words can produce in a 
recurrent loop (Elman, 2004; 2011). Theories of situated social cognition posit similar dynamic 
relations between mental states and stimuli. The mind is adapted to respond to situations and 
environments, and as such, cognitive processes are more situation-specific than previously 
acknowledged (Smith & Semin, 2004; 2007). As such, situations can prompt mental processes 
(reader-level factors) which alter the way in which stimuli (including words) are interpreted. 
States and mindsets that are tangential to a given text can nonetheless impact how it is 
interpreted. Conversational norms cause comprehenders to infer more information than a given 
statement provides. Motivations can change what information people focus on in statements and 
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affect the meaning they infer from them. And the processing style that a person reads a statement 
with can change the conclusions they draw from it. These reader-level factors affect the meaning 
of words and the conclusions of statements, and they are products of situated social cognition. 
Because the mind is adapted to respond to situations, contextual information that may not be 
relevant to the text itself has the capacity to alter a person’s mental processes, which affects the 
meaning that they interpret from statements. 
Implications of the model 
The combination of literatures showing contextually-sensitive meaning bears strongly 
upon the debate of how humans infer the meaning of words and statements. While many share 
the assumption that word meaning is stored in a mental lexicon and retrieved when a word is 
encountered (Katz & Fodor, 1963; Fodor, 1975; Aitchison, 2012), the above model catalogs 
ample evidence from both language comprehension and socially-situated judgments that 
contextual information affects the mental representations that are derived from reading 
statements. Mental lexicon theories are limited by their premise that the full range of 
contextually-sensitive meanings of words would reside within the information store (for a 
review, see Elman, 2011). For such a theory to be true, additional qualifications would need to be 
made to determine how the growing list of contextual factors could be contained and modeled 
within the lexicon and have sensitivity to online context. While this is of course possible and 
such models have been proposed (e.g., Jackendoff, 2002), these revised theories would require 
that mental lexicons contain much more information than is traditionally assumed to reside in a 
mental lexicon – collocations, verb aspect, sensory states, and conversational norms would all 
need to be elements contained within our mental dictionary’s representation of a single word’s 
range of contextually-sensitive meanings. A more parsimonious theory would be one that 
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includes context-sensitivity as a focal feature of language rather than as a nuisance deserving 
qualification, such as the dynamic systems models of language comprehension (for overviews of 
such models, see Elman, 2004; Elman, 2011). Such models suggest that words act as stimuli that 
activate mental associations rather than acting as cues for memory retrieval. These mental 
associations which comprise meaning-making are constrained by prior context and are updated 
as more stimuli are encountered. In essence, words may not act as direct references to meaning, 
but rather, they may act as clues to meaning (Rumelhart, 1979). The situation has as much power 
to determine the meaning of a statement as the words used to comprise the statement itself. 
Similar to the idea that attitudes may be constructed ad hoc (Schwarz, 2007), conceptual 
meaning may also be something that is constructed by the reader in response to words, contexts, 
and transient mental states (for a review, see Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015). 
 Altogether, the model proposes a conceptual framework demonstrating that the human 
mind is highly sensitive to context and situations. In contrast to nativist theories of language 
acquisition (Chomsky, 1957; 1965; 1988; Pinker, 2007), many of the factors suggest that 
language acquisition is not entirely inborn but instead involves learning and mapping words and 
phrases to contexts and situations. Words and constructions are learned by seeing the contexts in 
which they reside and knowing the circumstances of their use (Hoey, 2005, Ellis et al., 2015; 
Beckner et al., 2009). Understanding a word’s meaning involves comprehending the whole range 
of meanings of that word given the constraints of contextual words (Seidenberg & MacDonald, 
1999; MacDonald & Seidenberg, 2006) and situations (Swales, 1990) and knowing the 
constraints that the word imposes upon other words as well. Therefore, it is no surprise that 
newer models of language comprehension eschew the assumption that word meanings are 
retrieved from a static dictionary but instead endorse the assumption that words activate mental 
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states which are informed by context and which constrain the action of upcoming words (Elman 
2004; 2011). These factors show that situational information is at the heart of language, as it 
founds the basis of word learning and constrains the possible meanings of words in language 
comprehension. 
 The model also incorporates situational factors outside of language that demonstrate the 
contextually-sensitive nature of human reasoning. Motivations, goals, emotions, accessible 
concepts, norms, processing style – all of these factors influence reasoning by tuning it to the 
situations and considerations which are relevant for a person in a given situation. These same 
constructs also influence the interpretation of meaning as it is ultimately another phenomenon 
which calls upon reasoning, especially when disambiguating ambiguous words. In sum, 
reasoning is not dependent upon static abstract processes but rather is highly sensitive to context 
and situations. Language and reasoning share a sensitivity to context that suggest it is a 
fundamental aspect of the human conceptual system and human functioning. 
Interestingly, this emphasis on the context-sensitivity of reasoning is actually somewhat 
radical within social cognition, a field that is more cognitive than social (Zajonc, 1980). Many 
studies in the field assume that words and stimuli have a static meaning which all participants 
have access to. However, this overlooks the complex interdependencies between context and 
language. Social psychology is rife with studies where people make different judgments on the 
basis of the same information. Participants may have pre-existing attitudes that change their 
judgments or a problem may be framed in a way that guides judgment in a certain direction. 
Sometimes, these effects are framed as people paying attention to the “wrong” information or 
displaying some sort of non-optimal bias in their judgment. But these interpretations fail to 
appreciate that words and statements take on different meanings because of their 
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interdependence with contextual features of the situation and the reader. In these situations, 
people may not be making different judgments on the basis of the same information because 
these contextual features create different meanings. A person opposed to capital punishment may 
take away a different meaning from a news article on the subject because of his beliefs. People 
may be risk-seeking under loss framing because such a framing conveys only information about 
losses, which people are motivated to avoid. Reasoning is attuned to context when interpreting 
the meaning of information. Therefore, context may not only factor in at later stages when 
people are making their judgment. Instead, it may also play a role earlier in an earlier process of 
judgment, when people are making sense of the information presented to them. Akin to 
motivated perception (Balcetis, 2016), these processes may produce different judgments not 
because they change what people see as being important to the judgment, but instead because 
they fundamentally change what people see. 
 The model also has implications for common methodologies in social psychology. Many 
text-processing applications operate on the basis that words have a static, stable meaning. These 
programs exist for the purpose of summarizing properties of free text responses (such as LIWC – 
Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015; and sentiment analyses & opinion mining – Pang 
& Lee, 2008). Many of these applications work by extracting individual words from free-
response text and linking them to the words’ rating of interest. For instance, if a text contains the 
word “angry,” then an application may add a tally to the “negative affect” score for the text 
because the word is assumed to express some level of negativity. Many different word-norming 
dictionaries have been built for this purpose of documenting the underlying position of these 
words on many different dimensions, including affect (Mohammad & Turney, 2013; Warriner, 
Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013; Bradley & Lang, 1999; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010), arousal 
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(Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013), concreteness (Brysbaert, Warriner, Kuperman, & 
2014), dominance (Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013), and many other dimensions (for 
the most recent dictionaries of LIWC, see Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015). 
However, the now obvious issue for these word-norming dictionaries is that they rely upon the 
flawed assumption that these words have a static meaning that is shared among all language 
users. Furthermore, by only assessing the dimensions of individual words, these processes fail to 
model the complex interdependences between words within texts (such as verb aspect, 
collocation, and semantic prosody). Finally, these tools fail to account for the situation; LIWC 
would likely classify the writer of the Wikipedia article on anger management as being 
extremely high in negative affect simply because of the presence of anger-related words. As we 
know that context and situations are crucial elements of meaning, these tools may not be reliable 
indices of measuring these attributes. 
 Additionally, the observation that word meaning is context-sensitive has important 
implications for the current replication movement in psychology. Many researchers, concerned 
over the reproducibility of the psychology studies, have conducted large-scale efforts to conduct 
replications of prior studies (Open Science Collaboration, 2015, but also see Gilbert, King, 
Pettigrew, & Wilson, 2016). In these replications, researchers attempt mirror the procedures, 
materials, and stimuli of the original studies in order to see how robust they are. However, these 
replication efforts often fail to account for the context-sensitivity of words and statements, 
introducing confounding factors to the design that makes drawing conclusions about the 
reproducibility of such results meaningless. For instance, Doyen, Klein, Pichon, and Cleeremans 
(2012) famously failed to replicate the results a study by Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996) 
which showed that American undergraduates walked slower down a hallway after exposure to 
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elderly-related prime words. However, stereotypes of the elderly are different (for example, less 
frequent) in today’s English discourse than in the English discourse of participants from 1991, 
suggesting that associations between elderly-related adjectives and slow walking speed are likely 
less strong. Furthermore, the Doyen et al (2012) replication was conducted using elderly-related 
French adjectives, which are far less frequent in French than in English, on French 
undergraduates, who have fundamentally different stereotypes of elderly people (Ramscar, 
2015). Quite simply, replication efforts often fail to account for how the meaning of words 
changes over time and across situations. Words become more or less frequent or appear in 
different contexts over time, giving them different meaning associations. Therefore, modern 
replications that utilize even the exact materials of the original study may fail to produce the 
same interpreted meaning due to the contextually-sensitive nature of word meaning. 
Conclusion 
On the whole the evidence provided shows how human reasoning is highly sensitive to 
context and tuned to situations. Inferring the meaning of words draws upon a large number of 
contextual cues operating at various levels of analysis (word-level, sentence-level, text-level, and 
reader-level). Word meanings can change drastically from one context to the next; predominant 
meanings in one context can be infrequent in another and vice versa. Humans must have a 
contextually-sensitive cognitive system to be able to execute this one faculty that is uniquely 
human: production and comprehension of complex language. This same context-sensitivity is 
also a feature of situated social cognition, tuning cognitive processes to the affordances and 
constraints of the situation. Context, which it is linguistic or social, provides and constrains, and 
our adaptive cognitive system adjusts reasoning to account for it. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Word statistics for semantically prosodic words in Chapter IV. 
 attain get 
Most frequent right noun 
collocates 
 within 4 (Davies, 2008) 
goals, status, goal, level, 
degree, levels, objectives, 
power, success, knowledge 
people, job, lot, money, way, 
car, attention, things, time, 
chance 
Orthographic neighbors 0 14 
Frequency as verbs 
(COCA, Davies, 2008) 
5,743 (12 per mil) 1,317,745 (2,837 per mil) 
Mean coded definition 
valence 
2.0 2.0 
Mean sentiment analysis 
definition valence 
6.0 6.0 
Synonymy agreement 
with paired word  
95% 85% 
 
 lack not have 
Most frequent right noun 
collocates 
 within 4 (Davies, 2008) 
skills, power, resources, 
knowledge, experience, ability, 
confidence, support, sense 
time, access, money, power, 
right, effect, resources, 
information, opportunity 
Orthographic neighbors 12 16 (not), 12 (have) 
Frequency as verbs 
(COCA, Davies, 2008) 
24,086 (52 per mil) 45,012 (97 per mil) 
Mean coded definition 
valence 
1.9 2.0 
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Mean sentiment analysis 
definition valence 
5.7 5.6 
Synonymy agreement 
with paired word  
95% 100% 
 
 restore bring back 
Most frequent right noun 
collocates 
 within 4 (Davies, 2008) 
order, confidence, balance, 
power, health, faith, sense, 
democracy, government, peace 
memories, panel, life, boil, 
food, samples, days, people, 
sense, species 
Orthographic neighbors 0 3 (bring), 9 (back) 
Frequency as verbs 
(COCA, Davies, 2008) 
16,407 (35 per mil) 2,143 (5 per mil) 
Mean coded definition 
valence 
2.3 2.2 
Mean sentiment analysis 
definition valence 
5.2 5.5 
Synonymy agreement 
with paired word  
100% 100% 
 
 lend loan 
Most frequent right noun 
collocates 
 within 4 (Davies, 2008) 
money, support, hand, 
credence, credibility, name, air, 
legitimacy, institutions, voice 
money, $, campaign, dollars, 
car, government, company, 
copy, books, businesses 
Orthographic neighbors 10 6 
Frequency as verbs 
(COCA, Davies, 2008) 
10,271 (22 per mil) 1,210 (3 per mil) 
Mean coded definition 
valence 
2.0 2.0 
Mean sentiment analysis 
definition valence 
6.3 6.1 
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Synonymy agreement 
with paired word  
100% 100% 
 
 emphasize stress 
Most frequent right noun 
collocates 
 within 4 (Davies, 2008) 
importance, need, role, point, 
nature, aspects, education, 
development, fact, skills 
importance, need, role, point, 
fact, education, students, nature, 
people, work 
Orthographic neighbors 0 0 
Frequency as verbs 
(COCA, Davies, 2008) 
24,179 (52 per mil) 13,752 (30 per mil) 
Mean coded definition 
valence 
2.0 1.9 
Mean sentiment analysis 
definition valence 
5.9 5.5 
Synonymy agreement 
with paired word  
95% 95% 
 
 cause produce 
Most frequent right noun 
collocates 
 within 4 (Davies, 2008) 
death, problems, damage, pain, 
cancer, trouble, concern, 
disease, effect, harm 
results, effects, images, 
produces, electricity, goods, 
weapons, tons, amounts, films 
Orthographic neighbors 1 1 
Frequency as verbs 
(COCA, Davies, 2008) 
24,282 (52 per mil) 32,021 (69 per mil) 
Mean coded definition 
valence 
1.9 2.0 
Mean sentiment analysis 
definition valence 
5.4 5.8 
Synonymy agreement 
with paired word  
90% 100% 
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 encounter happen upon 
Most frequent right noun 
collocates 
 within 4 (Davies, 2008) 
problems, resistance, people, 
difficulties, problem, life, 
opposition, students, world, day 
situation, house, campsite, 
work, woman, winter, wings, 
wife, view, trail 
Orthographic neighbors 0 0 
Frequency as verbs 
(COCA, Davies, 2008) 
15,983 (34 per mil) 85 (0.2 per mil) 
Mean coded definition 
valence 
2.0 2.0 
Mean sentiment analysis 
definition valence 
5.8 5.6 
Synonymy agreement 
with paired word  
80% 95% 
 
 commit engage in 
Most frequent right noun 
collocates 
 within 4 (Davies, 2008) 
suicide, crime, crimes, murder, 
acts, act, troops, murders, 
perjury, people 
activities, behavior, activity, 
behaviors, sex, dialogue, kind, 
conversation, practices, process 
Orthographic neighbors 1 0 (engage), 6 (in) 
Frequency as verbs 
(COCA, Davies, 2008) 
34,721 (74 per mil) 9,755 (21 per mil) 
Mean coded definition 
valence 
2.0 2.0 
Mean sentiment analysis 
definition valence 
5.8 5.4 
Synonymy agreement 
with paired word  
95% 85% 
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 arouse evoke 
Most frequent right noun 
collocates 
 within 4 (Davies, 2008) 
suspicion, interest, curiosity, 
suspicions, feelings, ire, 
emotions, concern, attention, 
people 
memories, images, sense, 
response, image, feelings, 
feeling, responses, emotions, 
world 
Orthographic neighbors 1 0 
Frequency as verbs 
(COCA, Davies, 2008) 
3,099 (7 per mil) 6,148 (13 per mil) 
Mean coded definition 
valence 
2.2 2.0 
Mean sentiment analysis 
definition valence 
6.0 5.8 
Synonymy agreement 
with paired word  
95% 100% 
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